


**Issued Date:** December 16, 2025

**From:** Deputy Director Nelson R. Leese (on behalf of Director Bonnie J. Glenn)<sup>1</sup>  
Office of Police Accountability 

**Case Number: 2025OPA-0255**

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**Allegations of Misconduct & Director's Findings**

**Named Employee #1**

- 1. Allegation #1: 12.050 – Criminal Justice Information Systems, 12.050-POL 2. Inquiries Through ACCESS, or Any Other Criminal Justice Record System, Are Only to be Made for Legitimate Law Enforcement Purposes**

**Finding:** Sustained

- 2. Allegation #2: 12.050 - Criminal Justice Information Systems, 12.050-POL, 9. Employees Will Not Discuss or Provide Information to Any Person or Entity Who Is Not a Member of the Criminal Justice System**

**Finding:** Sustained

- **Imposed Discipline: Written Reprimand**
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**This Closed Case Summary (CCS) represents the opinion of the OPA Director regarding the misconduct alleged and therefore sections may be written in the first person.**

**Executive Summary:**

The Complainant, an SPD lieutenant, alleged that Named Employee #1 (NE#1) improperly accessed criminal justice records and improperly shared those records with her friends, Community Member #1 (CM#1) and Community Member #2 (CM#2).

**Administrative Note:**

On October 28, 2025, the Office of Inspector General certified OPA's investigation as thorough, timely, and objective.

## **Summary of the Investigation:**

On June 25, 2025, the Complainant submitted an OPA complaint detailing the following account. On November 17, 2024, a fight occurred outside a nightclub, resulting in CM#1 being assaulted and hospitalized for a brain injury. Due to CM#1's missing bankcard, Witness Detective #1 (WD#1), a detective in SPD's Robbery Unit, contacted CM#2, CM#1's wife. CM#2 had questions concerning the investigation but provided explicit details contained in the Mark43 police report. CM#2 indicated that she was friends with an SPD employee. On November 26, 2024, WD#1 received an email from NE#1 inquiring about the case's status. The Complainant noted that NE#1—a civilian employee—had no investigative or administrative duties related to the case. WD#1 replied that due to the ongoing investigation, she was unable to share information with NE#1. WD#1 later interviewed CM#1 once he was discharged from the hospital. CM#1 stated that the police report clouded his recollection of the incident, thereby complicating WD#1's investigation.

The OPA complaint continued. The Complainant requested an audit concerning the assault case and, following that audit, observed NE#1 accessing the Mark43 database nine hours after the initial 911 call, attempting to access records for which she lacked permission, and accessing other records. The Complainant contended that NE#1, in her role, lacked a legitimate reason for accessing these records and did not obtain permission from authorized personnel to do so. He did not find any public disclosure request authorizing the release of the police report. He opined that NE#1's disclosure of the police report, which eventually reached CM#1, rendered CM#1's recollection of the assault untenable for prosecution. He alleged that NE#1 improperly accessed criminal justice records out of concerns for a friend and then improperly released those records to that friend.

OPA investigated the complaint by reviewing the Mark43 audit log and email correspondence. OPA also interviewed WD#1 and NE#1.

SPD's technology and innovation captain provided the Complainant with an audit log detailing NE#1's Mark43 activities between November 17 to December 31, 2024. It showed the following:

- On November 17, 2024, NE#1 successfully accessed the police report twice and CM#1's profile once. One attempt to access a "case" page indicated a server error. Another attempt to access the "case" page indicated insufficient permission.
- On November 18, 2024, NE#1 successfully accessed the police report four times. Two attempts to access the "case" page indicated insufficient permission.
- On November 26, 2024, NE#1 successfully accessed the police report twice. One attempt to access the "case" page indicated insufficient permission.

- On December 16, 2024, NE#1 successfully accessed records associated with Incident #1 twice. Incident #1 involved CM#1 but was unassociated with the assault incident. Two attempts to access the “case” page indicated insufficient permission.
- On December 31, 2024, NE#1 successfully accessed the police report once, records associated with Incident #1 once, records associated with Incident #2 twice, and CM#1’s profile three times. Incident #2 also involved CM#1 and served as a follow-up to Incident #1.

On November 26, 2024, NE#1 emailed WD#1, expressing gratitude for WD#1’s investigation into the assault involving CM#1, her “friend.” NE#1 inquired about any recent updates to the case, as she lacked access to details “beyond the initial report in Mark43.” WD#1 replied 40 minutes later, writing, “Unfortunately[,] I cannot provide any details about the open investigation, but [CM#2] can give me a call if she has any questions! I can say that the investigation is ongoing[,] and we are making progress as of this morning.”

On September 10, 2025, OPA interviewed WD#1. She identified herself as a robbery detective who was assigned to investigate the assault on CM#1. She said she interviewed CM#1 after he was discharged from the hospital on December 5, 2024. She said CM#1 had difficulty in providing an independent recollection of the assault. She said CM#1 expressed uncertainty about whether his recollection stemmed from his own memory or the police report he had reviewed. She opined that this recollection issue could potentially jeopardize future prosecution.

On October 15, 2025, OPA interviewed NE#1. She described her duties within SPD’s Training Unit, which included reviewing police reports and data entries and documenting the types of medical assistance rendered by officers. She was unable to recall whether she received training on criminal justice information systems or completed recertification. She confirmed that CM#1 and CM#2 were her friends. She said she learned about CM#1’s hospitalization on November 17, 2024, so she reviewed the Mark43 police report that identified CM#1 as an assault victim. She admitted to printing the police report and handing it to CM#2. She also admitted to occasionally accessing the report to check for updates on the case and maintaining contact with CM#2. She said CM#2’s questions about the case prompted her to email WD#1. She acknowledged receiving warnings about insufficient permission but indicated that such messages were common in her work. OPA presented NE#1 with the Mark43 audit log showing that she had accessed records associated with Incident #1 and Incident #2. She acknowledged accessing those records and claimed to have been present during the incident. However, she said she decided to distance herself from the matter and refrain from further accessing those records. She expressed remorse about potentially jeopardizing future prosecution. She admitted to violating SPD policy but maintained that she did not believe her actions constituted an SPD policy violation at the time.

## **Analysis and Conclusions:**

### **Named Employee #1 – Allegation #1**

#### **12.050 – Criminal Justice Information Systems, 12.050-POL-2. Inquiries Through ACCESS, or Any Other Criminal Justice Record System, Are Only to Be Made for Legitimate Law Enforcement Purposes**

The Complainant alleged that NE#1 improperly accessed criminal justice records.

Inquiries through ACCESS, or any other criminal justice record system, must be made only for legitimate law enforcement purposes. SPD Policy 12.050-POL-2. Inquiries for personal or inappropriate use or disseminating the information can result in internal discipline, as well as penalties under federal and state law. *Id.*

OPA sustains this allegation. Between November 17 to December 31, 2024, NE#1 accessed the police report associated with the assault on CM#1 nine times, records associated with Incident #1 and Incident #2 five times, and CM#1's profile four times. NE#1 also made seven attempts to access the "case" page for which she lacked authorization. NE#1 herself acknowledged that her inquiries were for personal reasons, aimed solely at providing updates on the investigation to her friends, CM#1 and CM#2. This did not constitute a legitimate law enforcement basis to access any of these records. Particularly egregious was the fact that NE#1 was put on notice since November 26, 2024, that she lacked authorization to access any of these records. WD#1 explicitly emailed her, "I cannot provide any details about the open investigation." Yet, NE#1 circumvented WD#1's admonition by continuing to access multiple records associated with different incidents on December 16 and 31, 2024. OPA recognizes that NE#1 may have been motivated by concern or simple curiosity. But this does not excuse NE#1's violation of the policy.

Accordingly, OPA recommends this allegation be Sustained.

Recommended Finding: **Sustained**

### **Named Employee #1 – Allegation #2**

#### **12.050 – Criminal Justice Information Systems, 12.050-POL-9. Employees Will Not Discuss or Provide Information to Any Person or Entity Who Is Not a Member of the Criminal Justice System Without the Permission of the Chief of Police, or By Due Process of Law**

The Complainant alleged that NE#1 improperly shared criminal justice records with her friends, CM#1 and CM#2.

SPD employees will not discuss or provide information to any person or entity who is not a member of the criminal justice system without the chief of police's permission or due process of law. SPD Policy 12.050-POL-9.

OPA sustains this allegation. NE#1 admitted to printing the police report and handing it to CM#2, who eventually handed it to CM#1. CM#1 and CM#2 expressed awareness of the report to WD#1. However, CM#1 and CM#2 were not authorized to receive this report since they were not members of the criminal justice system. NE#1 did not obtain permission to release this report, whether through the chief's consent or legal process, such as a public disclosure request. NE#1's unauthorized disclosure was particularly egregious since it could have compromised a future prosecution. As above, NE#1's motivations—however understandable—do not excuse the policy violation.

Accordingly, OPA recommends that this allegation be Sustained.

Recommended Finding: **Sustained**

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**Footnote 1.** The OPA Director may designate a civilian OPA Deputy Director to “perform such duties and have such powers as the OPA Director may prescribe and delegate.” Seattle Ordinance 125315, Council Bill 118969, subchapter I, section 3.29.100(B).