



## CLOSED CASE SUMMARY

ISSUED DATE: APRIL 16, 2025

FROM: INTERIM DIRECTOR BONNIE GLENN  
OFFICE OF POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY

CASE NUMBER: 2024OPA-0414

### Allegations of Misconduct & Director's Findings

#### Named Employee #1

Allegation(s):		Director's Findings
# 1	12.050 - Criminal Justice Information Systems, 12.050-POL 2. Inquiries Through ACCESS, or Any Other Criminal Justice Record System, Are Only to be Made for Legitimate Law Enforcement Purposes	Sustained
Imposed Discipline		
Written Reprimand		

*This Closed Case Summary (CCS) represents the opinion of the OPA Director regarding the misconduct alleged and therefore sections are written in the first person.*

### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:

Named Employee #1 (NE#1) searched his wife's name (Community Member #1 or CM#1) in Mark43, the Seattle Police Department's records management system.

### ADMINISTRATIVE NOTE:

On February 21, 2025, the Office of Inspector General certified this investigation as thorough, timely, and objective.

### SUMMARY OF INVESTIGATION:

The Complainant—then an Assistant Chief of Police—submitted an internal Blue Team complaint to OPA on October 23, 2024. The complaint outlined that NE#1 was experiencing a personal problem with his spouse, CM#1. NE#1 discussed this with an SPD Captain and admitted "running" CM#1's name to an SPD Lieutenant. The situation was reported through the chain of command to the Complainant. NE#1 was placed on administrative leave.

SPD's Technical Agency Coordinator (TAC) conducted searches and identified that NE#1 searched CM#1's name in Mark43 on October 23, 2024. NE#1 did not search CM#1's name in any other systems or databases.

OPA identified two incident reports related to CM#1. CM#1 was involuntarily committed on October 14, 2024.<sup>1</sup> A second incident occurred eight days later, on October 22, 2024, when CM#1 was transported to Harborview Medical

<sup>1</sup> The ITA authorizes an officer to apprehend and transport a person to a facility when the officer reasonably believes that such person is suffering from a behavioral health disorder and presents an imminent likelihood of serious harm or is in imminent danger due to a grave disability. See RCW 71.05.153(2).



Center by the Sobering Unit Vehicle. A supplement report attached to the second incident noted that NE#1 reported CM#1 missing. The supplement, which was written by another officer, stated the following:

*5 days after coming to Seattle, [CM#1] was ITA'd by SPD from a [hotel], case #24-[#####]. Tonight, before coming to the precinct, [NE#1] talked with the command staff of her former unit and learned of her behavior which got her discharged. He also learned she believed people were conspiring to sexually assault her and kill her. [CM#1] has never tried to contact [NE#1] after arriving here and he said she does know where he lives. Tonight, while looking up the SPD incident on Oct 14th, we learned she had been ITA'd again by SPD a few hours earlier.*

OPA interviewed NE#1. He stated CM#1 was in the military and was stationed overseas. He said he received a phone call from CM#1's First Sergeant, who inquired about her wellbeing as CM#1 was discharged from service. NE#1 explained to OPA he was unaware CM#1 was discharged. CM#1's First Sergeant also referenced an incident involving the Port of Seattle Police Department, which NE#1 was unaware of. NE#1 described calling Port of Seattle PD and becoming concerned when he could not reach anyone there. NE#1 said he thought the First Sergeant may have mistaken the agency, so he used his computer at SPD Headquarters to access Mark43 to learn about CM#1. He learned about the October 14, 2024, incident—including sensitive medical information about CM#1—and went to Harborview but was unable to locate CM#1 there either. NE#1 said he reread the report then returned to his residence to check if CM#1 was there. CM#1 was not at NE#1's residence.

NE#1 explained that, after he returned to headquarters, he encountered the Night Duty Captain, reported the incident, and showed the captain the report. The captain connected NE#1 with a police officer to file a missing person report. While working with that officer, another report came in concerning CM#1, which NE#1 and the other officer read together. NE#1 learned CM#1 had again been taken to Harborview. There, NE#1 spoke with a social worker who informed NE#1 that they were unable to locate CM#1's passport or identification. NE#1 reread the police report to locate the hotel where CM#1 had been trespassed. NE#1 went to the hotel, but learned CM#1 had just fallen asleep in the hotel lobby, and had not rented a room.

NE#1 admitted he ran CM#1's name in Mark43 for personal use while he was trying to locate her. NE#1 stated he did not use any other system and did not ask any other officers to run her name for him. NE#1 acknowledged his understanding of his training on SPD policy that SPD computer systems were not for personal use. NE#1's Guild representative noted the unusual nature of the situation, and that NE#1 ran CM#1's name after receiving a concerning call from CM#1's military superiors that indicated CM#1 was potentially missing.

#### **ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS:**

##### **Named Employee #1 – Allegation #1**

**12.050 - Criminal Justice Information Systems, 12.050-POL 2. Inquiries Through ACCESS, or Any Other Criminal Justice Record System, Are Only to be Made for Legitimate Law Enforcement Purposes**

The Complainant alleged that NE#1 used criminal justice records systems for personal use.

SPD policy restricts inquiries of any criminal justice records system to "legitimate law enforcement purposes." SPD Policy 12.050-POL-2. "Inquiries made for personal use, or inappropriate use or dissemination of the information, can result in internal discipline, as well as penalties under federal and state law." *Id.* The policy includes, but is not limited



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to, the following records systems: DOL, DOC, WACIC, WASIS, NCIC III, LInX, and any inquiries processed through NLETS to other states. *See id.*

OPA finds that NE#1 violated this policy, which NE#1 admitted in his OPA interview. OPA acknowledges that NE#1 was very forthcoming in his OPA interview, and his reasons for running this search were not frivolous, even if they violated policy. But the appropriate course of action in this situation would have been to report CM#1 as missing. NE#1 could not conduct or participate in a law enforcement investigation in this situation. *See* SPD Policy 5.001-POL-18 (Employees must avoid conflicts of interest). Accordingly, his use of Mark43 was for personal use and he used the information he found to conduct inappropriate—even if well-meaning—investigative steps to locate CM#1.

Accordingly, OPA recommends this allegation be Sustained.

Recommended Finding: **Sustained**