



## CLOSED CASE SUMMARY

ISSUED DATE: FEBRUARY 21, 2025

FROM: INTERIM DIRECTOR BONNIE GLENN  
OFFICE OF POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY 

CASE NUMBER: 2024OPA-0333

### Allegations of Misconduct & Director’s Findings

Named Employee #1

| Allegation(s): |  | Director’s Findings               |
|----------------|--|-----------------------------------|
| # 1            | 5.001 – Standards and Duties, 5.001-POL-2. Employees Must Adhere to Laws, City Policy, and Department Policy | Not Sustained - Unfounded         |
| # 2            | 5.001 – Standards and Duties, 5.001-POL-10. Employees Will Strive to be Professional                         | Not Sustained - Inconclusive      |
| # 3            | 12.040 – Department-Owned Computers, Devices, & Software, 12.040-POL-1 General Policy                        | Not Sustained - Management Action |

*This Closed Case Summary (CCS) represents the opinion of the OPA Director regarding the misconduct alleged and therefore sections are written in the first person.*

### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:

Named Employee #1 (NE#1), a sergeant, was alleged to have inaccurately documented hours worked while on sick leave, unprofessionally ordered a subordinate officer to vacate a workstation, and used artificial intelligence (AI) to draft emails and Blue Team reports.

### ADMINISTRATIVE NOTE:

On January 16, 2025, the Office of Inspector General certified OPA’s investigation as thorough, timely, and objective.

### SUMMARY OF INVESTIGATION:

#### **A. OPA Complaint**

On August 14, 2024, the Complainant, a sergeant, submitted an OPA complaint, alleging the following:

- (1) On July 8, 2024, NE#1 inaccurately documented five hours of work and five hours of compensatory time off, despite no evidence showing that NE#1 worked that day.
- (2) On July 5, 2024, NE#1 unprofessionally ordered Witness Officer #1 (WO#1) to vacate a workstation assigned to her by Stationmaster #1 (SM#1). NE#1 reportedly told WO#1 that he was conducting a squad meeting at that location, which did not occur. NE#1 reportedly directed SM#1 to reassign WO#1 to another area, or a confrontation would result.
- (3) NE#1 used AI to draft emails and Blue Team reports.



OPA investigated the complaint by reviewing computer-aided dispatch (CAD) remote log records, proximity card records, NE#1's timesheet, a text message, photographs of the South Precinct sergeant's parking lot, email correspondence, a Blue Team report, and information technology (IT) computer scans. OPA also interviewed SM#1, the Complainant, Witness Officer #1 (WO#1), Witness Officer #2 (WO#2), Witness Officer #3 (WO#3), NE#1, a lieutenant, and a captain.

## **B. Evidence Concerning the Time Discrepancy Allegation**

Pertinent records concerning the time discrepancy allegation showed the following:

- CAD remote log records indicated that NE#1 was not logged in on July 8, 2024.
- Proximity card records showed that NE#1 did not scan his proximity card at any SPD facility on July 8, 2024.
- Timesheet entries reflected that NE#1 documented five hours of work and five hours of compensatory time off for July 8, 2024.
- A text message sent on July 7, 2024, at 4:49 PM, from NE#1 to a sergeant stated, "I'm going to be sick tomorrow. I have covid." The sergeant confirmed receipt of the text.
- Photographs of the South Precinct sergeant's parking lot did not depict NE#1's vehicle throughout the day on July 8, 2024.
- An email dated December 13, 2024, from NE#1 to payroll requested a correction to his timesheet, stating that it was "incorrectly marked" for July 8, 2024, and should have been documented as a sick day instead.<sup>1</sup>

## **C. Evidence Concerning the Artificial Intelligence (AI) Allegation**

NE#1 submitted to OPA a Blue Team report he authored with AI assistance. On December 6, 2024, he added the following comment:

*As requested, this is a sample of a [Blue Team] Report authored by me. As an advisement, the narrative in this document is not the exact output produced by Chatgpt or Grammarly. These features are generally used as an editor to review spelling, grammar, and tone evaluating generic wording. The generic wording is typed into a prompt followed by an evaluation request. The results are then produced then manually inputted into a separate draft word document. Any specific or sensitive wording was/is manually inputted by me after the fact. As with all usage, in a final edit of the narrative, I manually add additional information such as (Names, DOBS, [etc.] if required) in a word document. This sensitive information is not knowingly or intentionally disseminated to any 3<sup>rd</sup> parties.*

The Blue Team report appeared to be standard writing for a force review.

OPA requested from Seattle IT a scan of NE#1's computer to identify any AI-related websites NE#1 accessed. On January 7, 2025, Seattle IT reported that eight computers NE#1 used did not show any access to AI-related sites. Seattle IT also reported difficulty with connecting to three remaining computers NE#1 used.

<sup>1</sup> OPA received the OPA complaint on August 14, 2024, and notified NE#1 about the nature of OPA's investigation on September 12, 2024. NE#1 was already aware of OPA's investigation into his timekeeping before he emailed payroll on December 13, 2024.



#### **D. OPA Interviews**

##### Stationmaster #1 (SM#1)

On September 3, 2024, OPA interviewed SM#1. He confirmed that he assigned WO#1 to the workstation near NE#1's office. He said NE#1 told him that WO#1 needed to relocate, or a confrontation would result. He said he relocated WO#1 in response and expressed confusion about this matter being escalated to an OPA investigation.

##### The Complainant

On November 4, 2024, OPA interviewed the Complainant. He said WO#1 felt disrespected when NE#1 instructed her to vacate. He said several people told him that no squad meeting occurred that day. He characterized NE#1's conduct as unprofessional, demeaning, and a display of authority. He said he saw NE#1 enter paragraphs into ChatGPT, which subsequently generated a text output. He said he saw NE#1 copy the output and incorporate it into a Blue Team report. He said he saw text generated without NE#1 typing. He thought NE#1 entered sensitive information into ChatGPT.

##### Witness Officer #1 (WO#1)

On November 13, 2024, OPA interviewed WO#1. Her account of her interaction with NE#1 was consistent with the evidence summarized above. She described NE#1 as aggressive, angry, and rude when he directed her to leave for a squad meeting. She said she told NE#1 that she would leave after her morning meeting. She said she left after a few hours because she felt uncomfortable and unwelcomed in NE#1's presence. She said she reported the interaction to the Complainant.

##### Witness Officer #2 (WO#2)

On November 19, 2024, OPA interviewed WO#2. He said he was part of NE#1's squad and heard NE#1 discuss using ChatGPT for report writing. He recalled NE#1 asking him about whether he was interested in using ChatGPT to write his force report. He denied knowing specific information NE#1 entered into ChatGPT.

##### Witness Officer #3 (WO#3)

On November 26, 2024, OPA interviewed WO#3. He said he shared the same schedule as NE#1. He said he heard NE#1 using ChatGPT to draft emails and reports. He said NE#1 showed him how to use it as a study guide for the sergeant's exam. He said NE#1 entered the SPD manual, which is public information, into ChatGPT on an SPD computer.

##### Named Employee #1

On December 4 and 17, 2024, OPA interviewed NE#1.

#### **1. Time Discrepancy Allegation**

NE#1 said he was initially scheduled to work for five hours on July 8, 2024—an adjustment he made to the South Precinct staffing calendar in June—but he contracted Covid. He said the standard procedure involved a sergeant updating the Excel spreadsheet to reflect sick leave. He said he returned to work the following week and completed his timesheet based on the Excel spreadsheet, forgetting that he called in sick. He attributed the timekeeping discrepancy to an unintentional human error and mentioned that he did not correct his timesheet during the OPA investigation. He said he had sick leave available for use.



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## 2. Vacating Workstation Allegation

NE#1 said he was unaware of WO#1's assignment to that workstation. He said he asked her about her work duties that day, to which she said she was preparing for a meeting and would be present throughout the day. He said he asked if she could step aside so he could have a private conversation with an officer, but she declined and indicated that he could do so after her meeting ended. He said the interaction ended at that point. He did not believe his interaction with WO#1 was unprofessional. He confirmed that while he did not have a squad meeting scheduled, he required a private discussion with a squad member.

NE#1 said sergeants were situated in designated areas, whereas officers had multiple workstations available to them. He believed an officer should be separated from a sergeant to maintain fraternization and confidentiality. He said he approached SM#1 to request WO#1's reassignment due to a conflict of interest and to ensure confidentiality, as supervisors often conduct investigations or discuss personal matters with officers. He said officers typically do not get assigned to a sergeant's office.

## 3. Artificial Intelligence (AI) Allegation

NE#1 said he used Grammarly, ChatGPT, and Google AI on department computers. He said he did not consult with Seattle IT about these programs and was unsure whether they were pre-approved. He said, due to his dyslexia, he used these programs to ensure proper grammar, punctuation, and tone. For example, he said Grammarly identified errors after he entered a narrative. He said he drafted an email or Blue Team report and subsequently entered it into ChatGPT, a program he began using in 2024. He said ChatGPT assisted him in interpreting the SPD manual. He acknowledged the importance of not disclosing sensitive information, emphasizing that he would draft a narrative without sensitive information included and subsequently incorporate it after generating the output narrative. He maintained that he proofread, edited, and supplemented the new narrative accordingly. He denied ever entering sensitive information into these programs, recognizing the associated security risks. He said he was unaware of any SPD policy concerning AI use and believed the city policy was generic and lacked specific prohibitions. He did not believe he needed to credit the applicable AI program, as required under the city's generative AI policy, because it did not substantially generate the text. He maintained that he drafted the text entered into the AI program, which was then refined for punctuation, grammar, tone, or word choice.

### Lieutenant

On December 5, 2024, OPA interviewed a lieutenant. He said he tried to contact NE#1 after learning about the interaction between NE#1 and WO#1 but was unable to reach NE#1. He believed NE#1 should have escalated his concern to a watch commander instead of trying to resolve it himself. He believed NE#1 was using AI to edit reports but was unsure whether AI use was permitted or prohibited under SPD policy.

### Captain

On December 18, 2024, OPA interviewed SPD's technology and innovation captain. He said the King County Prosecuting Attorney's Office (KCPAO) issued a moratorium on accepting AI-generated reports. He mentioned a recently enacted city policy on AI that he described as lenient but noted that SPD policy did not address AI use or the conditions under which an officer could use it. He clarified that force investigations and emails were not criminal investigations, rendering the KCPAO directive inapplicable to these contexts. He said student officers were advised to refrain from using unsecure AI programs like Grammarly because they retained user input to enhance AI capabilities.



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He also expressed concern about entering sensitive information into ChatGPT and recommended that SPD develop a policy to regulate AI use. He did not believe there was a department-wide directive concerning AI and its applications.

**ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS:**

**Named Employee #1 – Allegation #1**

***5.001 – Standards and Duties, 5.001-POL-2. Employees Must Adhere to Laws, City Policy, and Department Policy***

The Complainant alleged that NE#1 inaccurately documented hours worked while on sick leave.

Employees must adhere to laws, city policy, and department policy. SPD Policy 5.001-POL-2.

Although NE#1's timesheet reflected the incorrect leave type, the evidence suggested that it was an unintentional error. NE#1 said he adjusted his work hours for July 8, 2024, in June, a month prior. On July 7, NE#1 texted a sergeant that he would not be working the following day due to Covid, and the sergeant acknowledged the text. There were no records showing that NE#1 accessed an SPD facility or his computer on July 8, corroborating his absence. NE#1 mentioned that he completed his timesheet the following week using an Excel spreadsheet that did not accurately reflect his sick leave. NE#1 later corrected that error, though it occurred several months later. Overall, the evidence did not support the time theft allegation, particularly given that NE#1 notified a sergeant of his impending absence and the minimal amount of time (five hours) that would have been misappropriated had he intended to commit time theft. More likely than not, such facts did not constitute misconduct.

Accordingly, OPA recommends this allegation be Not Sustained – Unfounded.

Recommended Finding: **Not Sustained – Unfounded**

**Named Employee #1 – Allegation #2**

***5.001 – Standards and Duties, 5.001-POL-10. Employees Will Strive to be Professional***

The Complainant alleged that NE#1 unprofessionally ordered WO#1 to vacate a desk assigned to her.

SPD employees must "strive to be professional." SPD Policy 5.001-POL-10. Further, "employees may not engage in behavior that undermines public trust in the Department, the officer, or other officers," whether on or off duty. *Id.*

There is no dispute about the content of NE#1's and WO#1's discussion. NE#1 asked about WO#1's work location and asked her to step aside to facilitate a private meeting. WO#1 declined but said she could relocate after her meeting ended. WO#1 relocated a few hours later. WO#1 perceived NE#1's conduct as aggressive, angry, and rude, while NE#1 disputed such characterizations. NE#1 maintained that his interaction with WO#1 was not unprofessional, and he articulated several valid concerns regarding her proximity to him, including the availability of other workstations and the need for confidentiality. Ultimately, OPA was unable to determine which account was more credible based on the available evidence, especially since there were no independent witnesses to the interaction. Nevertheless, OPA advises NE#1 to be mindful of his communication as a supervisor toward subordinates, as instructions could be perceived as unprofessional in how it is delivered or perceived to have been delivered.

Accordingly, OPA recommends this allegation be Not Sustained – Inconclusive.



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Recommended Finding: **Not Sustained – Inconclusive**

**Named Employee #1 – Allegation #3**

**12.040 – Department-Owned Computers, Devices, & Software, 12.040-POL-1 General Policy**

The Complainant alleged that NE#1 used AI to draft emails and Blue Team reports.

SPD employees using department-owned devices or software will follow the city’s security policy. SPD Policy 12.040-POL-1. Employees will protect passwords, maintain confidentiality of sensitive information, accept accountability for using their network accounts and access privileges, ensure that using city devices is restricted to authorized purposes, and follow other requirements. *Id.*

City employees may be authorized to use pre-approved generative AI software tools or may request a nonstandard acquisition of generative AI software through Seattle IT’s current request process. City of Seattle Generative Artificial Intelligence (GAI) Policy POL-209(1.1).<sup>2</sup> Outputs of generative AI systems must be reviewed before each use in an official city capacity. GAI Policy POL-209(2.1). If text generated by an AI system is used substantively in a final product, attribution to the relevant AI system is required. GAI Policy POL-209(3.2). Unless suitable enterprise controls and data protection mitigations are in place, employees shall not submit data that are classified by the city’s data classification guidelines as “Confidential” or “Confidential Information Requiring Special Handling,” or that otherwise are not considered to be acceptable to disclose to the public, to generative AI systems. GAI Policy POL-209(5.2).

OPA uncovered insufficient evidence establishing a violation of SPD Policy 12.040-POL-1 or the City of Seattle GAI Policy. While NE#1 admitted to using Grammarly, ChatGPT, and Google AI for drafting emails and Blue Team reports, he denied entering sensitive information into these programs. There was insufficient evidence challenging NE#1’s claim, as independent witnesses did not report observing any specific information he entered. Although the Complainant claimed to have seen NE#1 copy an output and incorporate it into a Blue Team report, such claim was consistent with NE#1’s account of his AI use. Other witnesses—WO#2 and WO#3—reported that NE#1 encouraged them to use ChatGPT for writing force reports or using it as a study guide for the sergeant’s exam. Under these circumstances, NE#1 did not appear to breach the confidentiality of sensitive information as outlined in SPD Policy.

Furthermore, NE#1’s use of AI programs—entering his drafted text, generating an output, and editing and supplementing the output with sensitive information—did not appear to violate the GAI Policy. NE#1 maintained that he reviewed, edited, and supplemented the output, consistent with GAI Policy POL-209(2.1). NE#1 also maintained that he drafted the text before entering it into the AI program, dispelling the need for AI attribution. This approach appeared to be consistent with GAI Policy POL-209(3.2) and unlikely to be classified as “substantive use,” given that NE#1 was the original author and subsequently reviewed and edited the output. Finally, as noted above, there was insufficient evidence indicating that NE#1 entered confidential information into AI programs that would have triggered the provisions of GAI Policy POL-209(5.2).

The GAI Policy encourages city departments to draft and tailor AI-specific policies to their business needs. *See, e.g.,* GAI Policy POL-209(3.5) (“Departments shall interpret “substantive use” thresholds to be consistent with the principles outlined in this document as well as relevant intellectual property laws”). As SPD’s technology and

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<sup>2</sup> See <https://seattle.gov/documents/Departments/SeattleIT/City-of-Seattle-Generative-Artificial-Intelligence-Policy.pdf>.



innovation captain noted, there is currently no guidance regarding AI use within the department. As such, SPD could benefit from a policy regulating AI use. This policy should outline a framework for AI, detailing whether AI use is permitted, the conditions under which AI may be used, approved AI programs, the nature of the information that may be entered into these programs, the permissible uses of AI-generated content, approved devices for AI use, source attribution guidelines, and any other pertinent policy considerations. Given the critical role of documentation in the law enforcement profession and the increasing prevalence of AI technologies, SPD should prioritize the creation of a policy regulating AI use.

Accordingly, OPA recommends this allegation be Not Sustained – Management Action.

Recommended Finding: **Not Sustained – Management Action**