



## CLOSED CASE SUMMARY

ISSUED DATE: FEBRUARY 28, 2025

FROM: INTERIM DIRECTOR BONNIE GLENN  
OFFICE OF POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY *Bonnie Glenn*

CASE NUMBER: 2024OPA-0287

### Allegations of Misconduct & Director’s Findings

Named Employee #1

Allegation(s):		Director’s Findings
# 1	12.050 - Criminal Justice Information Systems, 12.050-POL 2. Inquiries Through ACCESS, or Any Other Criminal Justice Record System, Are Only to be Made for Legitimate Law Enforcement Purposes	Sustained
<b>Proposed Discipline</b>		
Written Reprimand to 9 Hours (1 Day) Suspension		
<b>Imposed Discipline</b>		
Written Reprimand		

***This Closed Case Summary (CCS) represents the opinion of the OPA Director regarding the misconduct alleged and therefore sections are written in the first person.***

#### **ADMINISTRATIVE NOTE ON PROPOSED FINDINGS:**

*When the OPA Director recommends a sustained finding for one or more allegations, a discipline committee, including the named employee’s chain of command and the department’s human resources representative, convenes and may propose a range of disciplinary to the Chief of Police. While OPA is part of the discipline committee, the Chief of Police decides the imposed discipline, if any. See OPA Internal Operations and Training Manual section 7.3 – Sustained Findings.*

#### **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:**

It was alleged that Named Employee #1 (NE#1) used law enforcement databases to run the names of multiple individuals for non-law enforcement purposes from 2021 through 2024.

#### **ADMINISTRATIVE NOTE:**

On November 15, 2024, the Office of Inspector General certified this investigation as thorough, timely, and objective.

#### **SUMMARY OF INVESTIGATION:**

OPA interviewed the Complainant during another investigation. See 2024OPA-0282. During her interview in that case, the Complainant alleged NE#1 looked up criminal justice information without a law enforcement purpose. The Complainant is related to NE#1’s spouse (Community Member #1 or CM#1). The Complainant said CM#1 told her that NE#1 looked up CM#1’s mug shot and criminal records before their first date. The Complainant also stated NE#1



looked up whether a ticket appeared on her driving record as well as information about a friend (Community Member #2 or CM#2). The Complainant stated NE#1 used his work computer from home for this purpose.

OPA investigated the complaint by reviewing ACCESS<sup>1</sup> and SPD records and NE#1's training records. In addition to the Complainant, OPA interviewed the Complainant's partner (Community Member #3 or CM#3) and NE#1.

OPA requested records from SPD's Terminal Access Coordinator (TAC).<sup>2</sup> The TAC provided information showing that NE#1 ran the names of the Complainant (on February 21, 2024, and June 11, 2024), CM#3 (October 17, 2023; twice on November 7, 2023; twice on February 21, 2024; March 23, 2024), and CM#2 (September 19, 2021; November 11, 2021).

OPA reviewed NE#1's ACCESS certifications.<sup>3</sup> NE#1's most recent certifications were in 2016, 2018, 2020, 2021, and 2023.

OPA interviewed CM#3, who stated NE#1 had a computer he always used when he was working. CM#3 assumed it was a work laptop. CM#3 recalled the Complainant had a question about her driving history, and NE#1 said he would look it up. CM#3 said NE#1 was able to tell the Complainant when a ticket showed up. CM#3 also said NE#1 looked up things related to CM#3. CM#3 also said he thought NE#1 looked up CM#2's information.

OPA interviewed NE#1. NE#1 said he has worked for SPD for about twenty-six years and is currently a detective. He stated his understanding of policy is that law enforcement systems should only be used for law enforcement purposes. NE#1 admitted conducting the searches indicated by the SPD TAC. NE#1 also admitted there was no law enforcement purpose for doing so. Responding to the allegations, NE#1 said:

*Yeah, definitely did not use [] those services for law enforcement purposes. I just made sure that I didn't disseminate or share [the] information with anybody. I just ran it mostly on just requests and make sure they, they knew that there was something concerning about what I saw.*

#### **ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS:**

##### **Named Employee #1 – Allegation #1**

##### ***12.050 - Criminal Justice Information Systems, 12.050-POL 2. Inquiries Through ACCESS, or Any Other Criminal Justice Record System, Are Only to be Made for Legitimate Law Enforcement Purposes***

It was alleged that NE#1 accessed the criminal justice record systems without a legitimate law enforcement purpose.

<sup>1</sup> ACCESS is "A Central Computerized Enforcement Service System." ACCESS is a statewide law enforcement telecommunications system managed by Washington State Patrol. "It provides a means for agencies to query multiple state and national databases to include information systems provided by the Department of Corrections, Department of Licensing, Parks, the Washington Crime Information Center (WACIC), and the Washington State Identification Section (WASIS)." See <https://wsp.wa.gov/access>. ACCESS also allows national and international law enforcement queries.

<sup>2</sup> Law enforcement agencies with access to state and federal Criminal Justice Information Systems (CJIS) must designate an agency TAC who is responsible for ensuring compliance with policies and regulations. See SPD Policy 12.050-POL-5.

<sup>3</sup> "All employees who use terminals that have access to information in WACIC/NCIC files must be certified." SPD Policy 12.050-POL-3. After initial certification, employees must recertify every two years. See *id.*



Criminal justice databases contain extremely sensitive information, and their use is restricted to specific law enforcement purposes. These databases are regulated by state and federal law. Improper use of these systems can result in severe penalties for both the individual user and the entire department. *See* SPD Policy 12.050-POL-6. SPD Policy states that “inquiries through ACCESS, or any other criminal justice record system, are only to be made for legitimate law enforcement purposes.” SPD Policy 12.050-POL-2. Inappropriate use or dissemination of the information can result in internal discipline or penalties under federal and state law. *See id.*

It is beyond dispute that NE#1 accessed criminal justice record systems for improper, personal uses on several occasions over the years. Objective records from the SPD TAC established NE#1 looked up several individuals with whom he had a personal relationship. In his interview, NE#1 admitted doing so without a law enforcement purpose. OPA acknowledges NE#1’s candor and recognizes his long service to the Department. But improperly accessing criminal justice records is a serious policy violation that jeopardizes both the individual employee and the entire agency. NE#1 surely knew this having served with SPD for well over two decades and having completed multiple recent recertifications.

Accordingly, OPA recommends this allegation be Sustained.

Recommended Finding: **Sustained**