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We were not alone in our travails, of course. The largest utility in the West was driven into bankruptcy. Whole industries were shut down. Some utilities watched as their major industrial customers closed up shop, other utilities stranded salmon, others took on high cost, long-term contracts that would burden them and their customers for many years. None of those things happened at City Light. Our lights stayed on, we had a strong salmon year on the Skagit, and our major customers continued to operate. But at a cost. Among all the frustrations of this remarkable year, two stand out. The year 2001 was to be the year we implemented a plan approved by the Seattle City Council in 2000 that would reduce the impact of weather on our power supply and put in place more conservative financial planning parameters. By October of 2001, the plan was in place, allowing us to meet our customers’ needs with our own resources even in the worst water conditions. But the storm hit before our preparations were complete. The other frustration was with the stewards of the marketplace, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). In the face of the obvious, in the face of the recommendations of their own staff, the FERC failed to provide the regulatory oversight that would have saved customers billions of dollars and many thousands of jobs throughout the West. City Light survived this crisis thanks to steadfast support from its elected supervisors, the Mayor and City Council of Seattle, thanks to the skill and resilience of its workers, and thanks to an unparalleled commitment to extraordinary conservation measures by customer-owners. This annual report offers what we believe is a candid and accurate chronicle of the year’s unprecedented events and City Light’s responses. While we are still assimilating the experiences described here and making necessary adjustments in utility policies and practices, there is no question of City Light’s fundamental soundness and reliability as we move into our second century. Gary Zarker
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2001 HighlightsJanuary 2001 February 28, 2001 April 2001 June 2001 July 2001 September 11, 2001 October 2001 November 2001 Rainfall and snow pack exceed normal levels while national economy slips into a recession. December 2001 |
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Two thousand one will be remembered as the year all the rules changed. The tragedy of September 11 showed the world that unimagined events could indeed occur, and on a vast and horrific scale. For City Light, 2001 was the year when decades of conventional utility practice and assumptions collapsed amid the chaos of the western energy crisis, the costliest electrical energy event in the nation’s history. |
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By mid-2000, however, City Light found itself at the center of a collision of three unique factors: a contrived shortage of electricity in California that forced spot market prices to astronomical levels, a low-water year that robbed Seattle of both the power it needed for the winter and the surplus it sold in the summer, and the persistent refusal of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to police the western energy market. All these events combined to leave the utility with a record net loss of $52 million. We called it a "perfect storm" at the time, but worse turbulence lay ahead in 2001. In November 2000, the FERC staff told its commissioners that the markets were dysfunctional and prices were neither just nor reasonable, the standard the agency is required to enforce. Unfortunately, the FERC refused to do its regulatory job. By the end of 2000, City Light’s net expense for needed extra power soared to $104 million. In California, the situation was even worse. State government stepped in to buy power with taxpayer money as its major utilities ran out of cash. Seattle struggled, but kept its lights on. The cost of keeping the lights on was heavy. The Seattle City Council took the courageous, but unpopular step of raising rates in January, March, and July, as well as passing through an additional increase by the Bonneville Power Administration in October of 2001. To reduce purchases from the market, City Light’s residential and commercial customers rallied to the utility’s call to conserve an additional 10 percent "At Home and At Work." This reduced consumption saved as much as $80 million for energy purchased in 2001.
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Seattle City Light’s experiences cannot be separated from others in the West. Over the years, the Golden and Evergreen states developed a symbiotic relationship in which seasonal surpluses were exchanged - City Light bought California power in the winter and sold excess power in the summer. It was an efficient and effective arrangement. Even as the economic recovery of the roaring nineties was increasing demand in the West, reserves in the marketplace were still as strong as they had been at any time in the decade. But the market acted as if there was little energy available. As independent analysts Ann Stewart and Robert McCullough noted in a recent essay in The Seattle Times, "Every utility on the West Coast, from California to British Columbia, was blindsided by the crisis in California. While every utility had carefully studied the fundamentals of the market, they could not have predicted that California’s complex intervention in competitive markets had created incentives that rewarded major market players for withdrawing their electricity generation from the market." In May 2000, wholesale energy prices doubled. In June they doubled again. After a two month respite, when each megawatt hour still cost three times or four times what it had in prior years, the price shot up to 10 times historic levels. The volatility of the market was dramatized in December when cable television’s Weather Channel broadcast an erroneous daily forecast for subzero temperatures in the Pacific Northwest. Energy prices suddenly spiked from an already high $200 per megawatt hour to an astronomical $2,000/MWh by day’s end. The cold snap did not materialize – but the bills did. Power managers at City Light used the flexibility of the hydro system to reduce purchases during the day and buy power at night when it is cheaper. In some months, however, the difference between light-load hour and heavy-load hour disappeared. The utility’s risk management committee met frequently during the crisis, evaluating strategies in a superheated setting. Throughout the crisis, the FERC and other federal leaders refused to intervene, fearing intervention would be taken as an admission that the deregulation experiment had failed and failed badly. At the end of May, the new President capped a series of free market statements by saying "the only thing I won’t do is have price caps." Three weeks later, his new FERC Chairman, Pat Woods, announced price caps throughout the West. | |||||
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Nature Takes a HandAt 82 percent of its generation, City Light has the highest percentage of hydropower in the region. City Light planners use October as the beginning of the water year. The water year that began in October 2000 started badly and soon got worse. Despite predictions for normal precipitation, it was clear by mid-December that the region was in a drought. City Light’s wholly-owned hydro production would be cut in half. |
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In November 2001, the rains returned at last. Steady precipitation continued into December and January promising an above-normal water year for 2002. But for City Light, as with the rest of the world, nothing would ever be "normal" again. |
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The crisis came as City Light was changing its resource mix in profound ways. It contracted for power from a clean-burning gas generator in Southern Oregon in July of 2001 and a large wind farm near Walla Walla at the end of the year, to go with a new contract with the Bonneville Power Administration. It complemented these resources with new planning concepts to manage the new mix. Beginning on July 29, 2001, Seattle began receiving the energy output of 100 MW of capacity from the Klamath Falls gas-fired power plant under a five-year contract, renewable for five additional years. This 500-megawatt plant was developed jointly by the City of Klamath Falls and PacifiCorp Power Marketing of Portland. Klamath Falls is in southern Oregon, with good access to natural gas pipelines and the main electrical transmission line between California and the Northwest. The plant also incorporated greenhouse gas mitigation strategies. It replaced the 80 aMW lost when the coal-fired Centralia plant was sold more than a year before. In October, Seattle began a new contract with the Bonneville Power Administration. City Light and other power generators had long negotiated for a "slice" of the federal hydroelectric system. Seattle’s slice of the system is 4.6676 percent of the power generated by BPA. The actual amount of power will fluctuate, depending on rainfall. City Light will pay the same percentage of BPA’s system costs, including any budget overruns and debt payments to the U.S. Treasury. City Light accepts some risk of reduced power output caused by fish-protection measures on the Columbia River system. This sharing of risk with BPA also entitles City Light to enjoy any system benefits. For example, City Light will be able to market any surplus energy associated with its percentage of the system. The contract also gives City Light a "block" of BPA power. A block is a firm amount of power shaped (or scheduled) to a monthly net requirement. Under the block and slice contract, City Light will buy 493.8 average megawatts for the first five years of the contract and 608.2 average megawatts for the second five years. The contract runs until 2011. Based on price forecasts, the contract could save City Light millions of dollars compared to purchasing power from the wholesale market. By the end of 2001, Seattle had completed its contracts for purchase of the State Line Wind Project. The State Line project consists of 399 windmills built by Vesta in Denmark and erected by FPL Energy in Walla Walla County, Washington, and Umatilla County, Oregon. City Light will receive the energy output from 50 MW of wind-generated power during the first six months of 2002, increasing to 100 MW later in the year. Seattle is now the largest municipal utility purchaser of wind power in the nation. 
The net effect of these decisions is that City Light can meet its load in almost all months under poor water conditions with resources it controls. Not only does this protect against future drought, but it produces surpluses in good water conditions that can be sold in the marketplace. Combined with more conservative financial policies, the result is that the utility will pay back its energy crisis debt more quickly and move to lower and more stable rates in the future. In addition, City Light’s efforts to meet the challenge of mitigating all of its CO 2 emissions attributable to generation is leading to growing expertise in the field of greenhouse gas mitigation. A project to identify and pursue mitigation strategies is well underway. The experience gained during this process will become a best practice for utilities around the country. |
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Since 1976, conservation has been part of Seattle’s energy policy. The conservation accomplishments of many years combined in 2001 to save ratepayers significant amounts of money. All of those measures in place represented expensive power that did not have to be purchased.
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City Light Helped Its Customers Save Power and Reduce Their Light Bills in Other Ways By:
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The economic downturn nationwide, particularly in the high tech industry, meant that the expected demands of new large customers did not materialize. Plans for electricity-intensive installations such as data centers – called server farms and telco hotels – were canceled, delayed, or reduced. These decreases in expanding services helped reduce expenditures for new service at a critical time. |
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In the face of numerous challenges, natural and financial, City Light crews kept the turbines and generators turning. At Boundary, the rehabilitation of Unit 52 was completed, the fifth of six huge generators to be reworked. This 12-year, $131 million project is being accomplished largely in-house by City Light staff. When City Light first started building its hydro facilities in 1902, construction workers and City Light employees were housed in self-contained towns built just for that purpose. Cedar Falls, Newhalem, and Diablo later evolved into distinct communities. When construction began for Boundary Dam in the 1960s, City Light changed this approach and relied upon the nearby town of Metaline Falls to house its people. The utility wanted to be a good neighbor and City Light contributed to new and improved roads, a high school, a medical facility, and other municipal services. This tradition continued in 2001 when City Light completed a fiber optic link between the dam and the Power Control Center in Seattle. The line was expanded to schools and libraries in Metaline Falls to tap directly into the Internet. Students and library patrons can now use the Information Superhighway as conveniently as in any "wired" metropolitan area. |
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After the terrorist attacks on September 11, security assumed a new importance. City Light had to reexamine its approach to public access. The popular tours of the Upper Skagit Hydroelectric Project that began in the 1920s were suspended, the first time since World War Two. Increased security throughout the community has affected the way City Light employees access customer properties for such things as repairs and maintenance and reading meters. Like the rest of the community, City Light changed while still going about its daily business. |
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City Light’s policy of Fish First continued to produce results in 2001. Managers resisted the temptation to use water to turn generators when energy prices were high in order to insure that sufficient water was available to protect salmon egg nests, called redds, in shallow water. The fragile redds must remain just below the surface for eggs to hatch into juvenile salmon, and water that is too deep or runs too quickly can easily wipe out the nests and a generation of fish. More than two million Pink Salmon returned to the Skagit in 2001, up from 300,000 a decade before. The 2001 adult Chinook return ran almost 15,000, three times the 10-year average. As a demonstration of the complexity of the Skagit ecosystem, the increase in the salmon runs caused an upswing in the population of the endangered American Bald Eagle, which feed on the pawned-out carcasses. At one time this symbol of our nation was near extinction. Today, the Skagit hosts the largest population of Bald Eagles in the continental United States. City Light’s efforts at restoring salmon runs were years ahead of the federal listing of salmon as a threatened species. Today, more than three quarters of the Skagit’s salmon spawn within the 25 miles of river affected by dam flow. City Light purchased 78 additional acres in four parcels on the Skagit and the Tolt rivers that will be preserved from development and improved to provide safe drainages and clean stream beds where fish can spawn. Illabot Channel, a key Chum Salmon spawning area, was extended 1,400 feet. In the Skagit Basin, City Light now owns more than 8,000 acres of protected habitat. In North King County, the Tolt River is being reconnected to its historic course by moving back flood control levees. The wider flood plain will still provide protection from high water while increasing riparian habitat. |
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Closer to home, City Light day-to-day operations have also gone green. City Light is a large industrial operation that uses fuels, solvents, paints, and other chemicals. Ten years ago, the utility generated more than 100,000 pounds of hazardous wastes that had to be treated, stored, or disposed of. By using less hazardous materials in its operations, reducing waste, and by recycling, this figure has dropped to 16,000 pounds a year, saving customers money and improving the health of the environment. | |||||
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One of the original goals of Seattle’s Municipal Lighting Plant was to bring the benefits of electricity to all. In this year of rate increases, City Light enhanced its traditional rate assistance programs to keep electricity flowing to customers who can least afford it. Along with expanding eligibility for low income rate assistance, the City Council added money for outreach, helping to increase participation particularly among elderly. More than 60 percent of seniors who qualify actually take advantage of rate assistance. The council also decided to match contributions to Project Share. Started in 1984 during the last major electrical crisis in the Northwest, Project Share accepts donations from customers who add a few dollars to their bills every two months. These donations help defray the bills of less fortunate members of the community. In April, the City Council voted to match the first $400,000 contributed by the community. By the end of 2001, Project Share raised $371,508 in gifts, all of it matched by the council, from customers. Nearly 2,000 customers benefited. This year City Light replaced its aging customer account and billing system with the Consolidated Customer Service System. CCSS is a joint effort by City Light and Seattle Public Utilities to bring together all of Seattle’s municipally-owned utilities – electricity, water, and solid waste – into a single customer database. This was an immense project which involved dissimilar services in separate departments and approximately 700,000 customers. Planning, development, and testing took four years and $40 million. On April 2, 2001, the new system went "live." The conversion not only endured the predictable challenges of any computer changeover, but had to accommodate three overlapping customer databases, the disparate pricing structures of three departments, and 10 different rate changes. |
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City Light’s financial results in 2001 were severely impacted by poor water conditions in the Northwest region and high prices in the wholesale electricity market in the Western United States. Due to low rainfall and streamflows in the watersheds supplying the Department’s hydroelectric resources, the Department was required to purchase large amounts of energy in the wholesale market through September 2001 in order to serve its retail customers. Prices in the wholesale market through May 2001 were at extraordinarily high levels throughout the Western region. The Department’s need to purchase wholesale energy diminished in the second half of the year, as contracts for the purchase of additional power from the Klamath Falls Cogeneration Project and the Bonneville Power Administration took effect. The Department raised rates four times in 2001 to deal with the financial effects of its high power costs. However, the additional revenue from these rate increases offset only a portion of the increase in power costs. The Department therefore experienced a net loss of $73.3 million for the year after deferral of $300 million in excess power costs from 2001 to future years. Operating Revenues Retail Power Revenues. Revenue from sales of energy to retail customers in the Seattle service area totaled $503.4 million in 2001, an increase of 28.6 percent over the $391.6 million in revenue recorded in 2000. This increase occurred in spite of the fact that the quantity of energy delivered to retail customers in the service area actually declined by 5.1 percent from the 2000 level. Consumption of electricity declined in response to rate increases, the Department’s campaign for reduction of energy use, and the regional economic recession. Rates were increased four times in 2001. Average rates increased by 9.8 percent on January 1, 18.0 percent on March 1, 9.3 percent on July 1 and 10.3 percent on October 1. The first three increases were required in order to offset the effect of high purchased power costs. The final increase passed through to customers the financial effects of increases in Bonneville power rates on October 1, 2001, as mandated by the City Council. Wholesale Power Sales . Wholesale power revenues include revenue from short-term sales to utilities and other wholesale market participants, the valuation of power delivered under seasonal exchanges, and other energy credits. Revenue from sales of energy in the wholesale market fell from $103.1 million in 2000 to $75.3 million in 2001, a decrease of 26.9 percent. The quantity of energy sold was 78.9 percent lower in 2001 than in the preceding year. The decrease in energy sold was offset by an increase in the average sales price, from $46.04 per MWh in 2000 to $161.90 in 2001. The value of energy delivered to other utilities under seasonal exchange contracts and other energy credits totaled $33.2 million in 2001, a substantial increase from the $5.1 million recorded in 2000. This increase was in part due to a change in the method of calculating the value of energy delivered under exchange contracts. Transmission and Other Revenues . Transmission and other revenues include revenue from basis sales, from the rental of utility properties, from the sale of transmission rights, and from miscellaneous fees and charges. Revenue in this category increased from $5.9 million in 2000 to $15.6 million in 2001. Basis sales involve the simultaneous purchase and sale of power at different geographical points with a result that is equivalent to the transmission of power from the point of purchase to the point of delivery. Valuation of the delivery side of basis transactions in 2001 amounted to $6.9 million, an increase of $6.4 million over the 2000 level. Rental of transmission lines to the Bonneville Power Administration (BPA) generated $1.3 million in 2001, an increase of $0.6 million from 2000. Revenue from the sale of transmission rights provided an additional $1.5 million in 2001, or $0.6 million more than in 2000. Miscellaneous fees and charges brought in $5.9 million in revenue in 2001, compared with $3.8 million in 2000. In summary, total operating revenue increased from $505.6 million in 2000 to $627.6 in 2001. By far the largest part of this increase was a result of rate increases enacted in 2001. Operating Expenses Operating Expenses increased from $543.7 million in 2000 to $654.8 million in 2001, an increase of $111.1 million, or 20.4 percent. Increases in costs related to long-term purchased power contracts account for three-quarters of the increase. Significant increases also occurred in short-term wholesale power purchases, transmission expenses, customer service costs, and taxes. A decline in generation costs partially offset the growth in these categories. Long-Term Purchased Power . The cost of power purchased under long-term contracts with other utilities increased from $79.3 million in 2000 to $151.2 million in 2001, an increase of $71.9 million, or 90.7 percent. On July 29, 2001 the Department began to receive power from the Klamath Falls Cogeneration Project under the terms of a contract that took effect on July 1, 2001. Power delivered from this project cost $18.4 million in 2001. Purchases of power from BPA under a new contract effective October 1, 2001 increased significantly from 195 average MW under the former contract to 502 average MW in the fourth quarter of 2001. The rates charged by Bonneville for this power under the new contract were also higher because Bonneville had exercised its right to increase rates to cover the increase in its costs resulting from poor water conditions and high wholesale prices. As a result, the cost of power purchased from BPA increased from $34.4 million in 2000 to $66.8 million in 2001. The value of energy delivered to City Light under seasonal exchanges increased from $6.4 million in 2000 to $28.0 million in 2001, largely as a result of a change in the method of valuing the energy received. The cost of power purchased under other long-term contracts fell slightly, from $38.5 million in 2000 to $38.0 million in 2001. Wholesale Power Purchases: Short-Term . Poor water conditions in 2001 required City Light to purchase large amounts of energy in the wholesale market at elevated prices. City Light incurred costs of $520.4 million in purchasing power in the wholesale market in 2001, an increase of $308.4 over the 2000 level of $212.0 million. The average price paid for the 2,411,210 MWh of power purchased in 2001 was $215.15 per MWh. In 2000 City Light paid an average of $86.47 for 2,451,348 MWh of wholesale power. In addition, the Department paid $4.0 million to large industrial customers for voluntary curtailment of consumption during the period of high market prices in 2001, compared to $0.4 million in 2000. In May 2001 the City Council authorized the Department to defer a portion of the cost of wholesale power purchases in 2001 and to amortize the deferred costs in future years. Accordingly, excess power costs in the amount of $300 million have been deferred from 2001 to future years. Because of the deferral, only $224.4 million of wholesale power costs are shown as an expense in 2001. Transmission. Transmission expense grew from $21.7 million in 2000 to $30.3 million in 2001, an increase of $8.5 million, or 39.3 percent. The valuation of the purchase side of basis transactions accounts for $4.4 million of this increase. The cost of transmission services under contracts with BPA increased by $3.1 million from 2000 to 2001. The Department contracted for an additional 650 MW of transmission capacity from BPA, effective October 1, 2001, to accommodate the higher amount of power available under the new power sales contract with BPA. In addition, BPA’s transmission rates increased by 24.3 percent on October 1, 2001. Customer Service. The cost of customer services rose from $22.2 million in 2000 to $27.5 million in 2001, an increase of $5.3 million. Bad debt expense increased by $1.9 million, reflecting the economic slowdown in the Puget Sound region and the increases in City Light’s rates in 2001. The implementation of the City’s new Consolidated Customer Service System for City utilities accounted for an additional increase of $1.4 million from the 2000 level. Expense for media advertising, primarily to encourage curtailment of consumption during the period of high wholesale market prices in 2001, increased by $1.3 million over 2000. Other customer service expenses grew by $0.7 million. Generation. Operating and maintenance expenses for the Department’s generating resources decreased from $25.7 million in 2000 to $17.0 million in 2001, a decrease of $8.7 million. The sale of the Department’s 8 percent share of the Centralia Steam Plant in May 2000 accounts for $7.1 million of the decrease. Hydroelectric operations and maintenance expenses declined by $1.6 million from 2000 to 2001, due in part to a credit for prior-year administrative charges paid to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and to lower operating costs at the South Fork Tolt Project. Taxes. Tax expense was $52.6 million in 2001, an increase of $9.7 million from the 2000 level. Taxes paid to the City of Seattle and the State of Washington account for most of the growth in this category. State and City taxes are levied as a percentage of gross revenue. The increase in tax payments parallels the increase in revenue. Other Operating and Maintenance Expenses. Increases in the value of the Department’s plant and equipment, including the new customer billing system, resulted in an increase of $6.0 million in depreciation expense, from $55.5 million in 2000 to $61.5 million in 2001. Distribution expenses increased from $34.5 million in 2000 to $36.5 million in 2001. Administrative and general expenses, net of amounts allocated to capital projects, rose from $37.0 million to $39.1 million. Both of these increases reflect a reduction in the level of activity in the Capital Improvement Program, which resulted in a corresponding shift of costs to operating activities and a lower allocation of administrative and general expenses to capital projects. Conservation costs increased from $7.0 million to $8.5 million, reflecting an increase in the amortization of past conservation investments. Power marketing and system control expenses increased from $5.5 million in 2000 to $6.1 million in 2001. Non-operating Revenues (Expenses) Interest Expense and Amortization of Debt Expense. Debt-related expenses, including interest and the amortization of debt expense, increased from $53.2 million in 2000 to $73.9 million in 2001, reflecting interest expensed on bonds and notes issued in 2000 and 2001. In December 2000, the Department issued $98.8 million in long-term bonds at an effective interest rate of 5.30 percent to finance capital requirements. In March 2001, the Department issued an additional $503.7 million in long-term bonds at an effective interest rate of 5.08 percent to finance capital expenditures and refinance certain outstanding bonds. In the following month, $182.2 million in two-year revenue anticipation notes were issued at an effective interest rate of 3.84 percent to fund the anticipated deficit in the Department’s operating cash flow. Interest costs on these issues were partially offset by the effect of the March 2001 refunding of $125.1 million in outstanding bonds. Also, $9.8 million in interest costs on the March 2001 long-term bond issue was paid from bond proceeds rather than from current revenues. Investment Income. Investment income of $13.5 million in 2001 exceeded the 2000 level of $9.8 million by $3.7 million. The increase is attributable to interest earnings on the investment of the unused proceeds of the March 2001 first-lien bond issue, partially offset by interest on borrowing from the City’s cash pool. As of December 31, 2001, $161.7 million of bond proceeds remained in the Construction Account. At various points in 2001, the Department’s operating cash balance in the City’s cash pool was negative. Interest expense related to the Department’s negative balances offset interest earnings on the Construction Fund and the Bond Reserve Account. In December 2001, the City Council authorized a loan of $110.0 million from the cash pool to cover the negative balances. As of December 31, 2001 the outstanding balance on the loan from the cash pool was $100.0 million. Gain on Sale of Centralia Steam Plant. In 2000 the Department recorded a gain of $29.6 million from the sale of its 8 percent share of the Centralia Steam Plant. There was no comparable transaction in 2001. Fees, Grants and Transfers As required by GASB Statement No. 33, in 2001 the Department began reporting non-exchange transactions as revenues on the operating statement. Fees, grants and transfers in 2001 amounted to $15.3 million. Capital fees, previously reported in equity, as contributions in aid of construction, constitute the main component of this category. In 2001 capital fees, mainly in the form of construction charges, were $12.5 million. Operating grants from the state and federal governments, primarily to support conservation and renewable investments, and a transfer from the City of Seattle to fund conservation programs and support for low-income customers totaled $2.8 million. Net Income (Loss) The Department recorded a net loss of $73.3 million in 2001 versus a net loss of $52.0 million in 2000. Equity as of December 31, 2001 was $300.1 million. |
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Superintendent, City of Seattle – City Light Department We have audited the accompanying balance sheets of the City of Seattle – City Light Department (the Department) as of December 31, 2001 and 2000, and the related statements of operations and changes in retained earnings and of cash flows for the years then ended. These financial statements are the responsibility of the Department’s management. Our responsibility is to express an opinion on the financial statements based on our audits. We conducted our audits in accordance with auditing standards generally accepted in the United States of America. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain reasonable assurance about whether the financial statements are free of material misstatement. An audit includes examining, on a test basis, evidence supporting the amounts and disclosures in the financial statements. An audit also includes assessing the accounting principles used and significant estimates made by management, as well as evaluating the overall financial statement presentation. We believe that our audits provide a reasonable basis for our opinion. In our opinion, the financial statements referred to above present fairly, in all material respects, the financial position of the Department as of December 31, 2001 and 2000, and the results of its operations and its cash flows for the years then ended in conformity with accounting principles generally accepted in the United States of America. As discussed in Note 1 to the financial statements, the Department was required to adopt Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) No. 133, Accounting for Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities, SFAS No. 138, Accounting for Certain Derivative Instruments and Certain Hedging Activities an amendment of FASB Statement No. 133, and Governmental Accounting Standards Board No. 33, Accounting and Financial Reporting for Nonexchange Transactions, effective January 1, 2001. Deloitte & Touche LLP |
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Elected Officials(As of January 2002)Mayor Greg Nickels Seattle City Council Jim Compton Richard Conlin Jan Drago Nick Licata Richard McIver Judy Nicastro Margaret Pageler Heidi Wills City Attorney |
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Executive TeamGary Zarker Dana Backiel Mike Sinowitz Jesse Krail Joan Walters Jim Ritch Nancy Glaser Bill Kolden Bob Royer |
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Seattle City Light 2001 Annual Report
© Seattle City Light, City of Seattle
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