City of Seattle

2024 Surveillance Impact Report

Acoustic Gunshot Location System

Seattle Police Department

Surveillance Impact Report ("SIR") overview

About the Surveillance Ordinance

The Seattle City Council passed Ordinance 125376, also referred to as the "Surveillance Ordinance," on September 1, 2017. SMC 14.18.020.b.1 charges the City's executive with developing a process to identify surveillance technologies subject to the ordinance. Seattle IT, on behalf of the executive, developed and implemented a process through which a privacy and surveillance review is completed prior to the acquisition of new technologies. This requirement, and the criteria used in the review process, are documented in Seattle IT Policy PR-02, the "Surveillance Policy".

How this Document is Completed

This document is completed by the requesting department staff, support and coordinated by the Seattle Information Technology Department ("Seattle IT"). As Seattle IT and department staff complete the document, they should keep the following in mind.

1. Responses to questions should be in the text or check boxes only; all other information (questions, descriptions, etc.) Should **not** be edited by the department staff completing this document.
2. All content in this report will be available externally to the public. With this in mind, avoid using acronyms, slang, or other terms which may not be well-known to external audiences. Additionally, responses should be written using principally non-technical language to ensure they are accessible to audiences unfamiliar with the topic.

Surveillance Ordinance Review Process

The following is a high-level outline of the complete SIR review process.

Upcoming for Review	Initial Draft	Open Comment Period	Final Draft	Working Group	Council Review
The technology is upcoming for review, but the department has not begun drafting the surveillance impact report (SIR).	Work on the initial draft of the SIR is currently underway.	The initial draft of the SIR and supporting materials have been released for public review and comment. During this time, one or more public meetings will take place to solicit feedback.	During this stage the SIR, including collection of all public comments related to the specific technology, is being compiled and finalized.	The surveillance advisory working group will review each SIR's final draft and complete a civil liberties and privacy assessment, which will then be included with the	City Council will decide on the use of the surveillance technology, by full Council vote.

				SIR and submitted to Council.	

Privacy Impact Assessment

Purpose

A Privacy Impact Assessment ("PIA") is a method for collecting and documenting detailed information collected in order to conduct an in-depth privacy review of a program or project. A PIA asks questions about the collection, use, sharing, security and access controls for data that is gathered using a technology or program. It also requests information about policies, training and documentation that govern use of the technology. The PIA responses are used to determine privacy risks associated with a project and mitigations that may reduce some or all of those risks. In the interests of transparency about data collection and management, the City of Seattle has committed to publishing all PIAs on an outward facing website for public access.

When is a Privacy Impact Assessment Required?

A PIA may be required in two circumstances.

1. When a project, technology, or other review has been flagged as having a high privacy risk.
2. When a technology is required to complete the surveillance impact report process. This is one deliverable that comprises the report.

1.0 Abstract

1.1 Please provide a brief description (one paragraph) of the purpose and proposed use of the project/technology.

Acoustic Gunshot Location Systems (AGLS) utilize microphones placed in a defined geographic area that are programmed to detect the sound of gunshots and alert police and 9-1-1 when and where the incident has taken place. The system may or may not have human verification involvement.

The SPD proposes deploying AGLS in select areas to accelerate the response capabilities of police and EMS personnel to aid victims, locate and preserve evidence, and hold accountable those responsible for gun violence. AGLS will only record gunfire. It does not record conversations or sounds that are not gunfire. Data can be extracted from the system for investigative use.

1.2 Explain the reason the project/technology is being created or updated and why the PIA is required.

Gun violence, human trafficking, and other serious felony crimes are often concentrated at specific geographic places, and long-time efforts to prevent these crimes have not been consistently successful. SPD is experiencing unprecedented patrol and investigations staffing shortages, which hinders police effectiveness.

Deploying AGLS would mitigate these unprecedented patrol and investigations staffing shortages by leveraging evidence-based and industry-standard technologies to deter gun

violence where it is concentrated. AGLS would also accelerate the response capabilities of police and EMS personnel to aid victims, locate and preserve evidence and hold accountable those responsible for gun violence.

2.0 Project / Technology Overview

Provide an overview of the project or technology. The overview gives the context and background necessary to understand the purpose, mission and justification for the project / technology proposed.

2.1 Describe the benefits of the project/technology.

Serious felony crimes are often concentrated at specific geographic locations in Seattle and long-time efforts to prevent these crimes have not been consistently successful. Police effectiveness is further hindered due to unprecedented patrol and investigation staffing shortages in the Seattle Police Department. Implementing AGLS technology provides benefits not only to officers but also to the victims of gun violence.

The benefits of AGLS technology for a victim(s):

- Victims are located more quickly if 911 callers cannot tell operators the exact location.
- Due to the ability of the sensor to pinpoint a precise location, officers arrive on the scene faster, leading to the ability to render aid or lifesaving assistance sooner until an EMT arrives.

Increased investigative information helps lead to justice for victims. The benefits of AGLS technology for a community:

- Data collected on gunshots can be shared with the community and community-based organizations to help mitigate the effects of firearms-related violence. For example, violence interrupters could focus their efforts on areas where gunshots most frequently occur, down to the block level.
- Assists in acquiring necessary evidence such as shell casings. This would assist responding officers and investigators in knowing the exact number of shots fired.
- Increased reliability of number of shots fired and timing between shots, and exact location of gunshots.
- Increased investigative evidence can aid in the capture and prosecutions of offenders, leading to reduced violence and fewer firearms on the street. Increased evidence can also help exonerate the innocent.

The benefits of AGLS technology for an officer:

- Availability to pinpoint precise location rather than just the address – i.e., if shots fired were behind a building or in the middle of a park. This helps navigate officers to the correct location fast. Sensors can locate within approximately 80 feet of gunfire. Today, it is difficult to pinpoint location with 911 call data only.

- Provides better information on what kind of weapon was fired – i.e., full auto or high capacity and if multiple shooters are involved. This allows for better preparation by the officer before arriving on scene.
- Provides a data-driven approach to police response and staffing.

2.2 Provide any data or research demonstrating anticipated benefits.

While the current literature on AGLS does not support its efficacy as a means to improve the speed and quality of police response, nor a means of enhanced reporting, no research to date has addressed the application of AGLS in the context in which SPD intends to deploy it as a component of a broader forensic tool to support criminal investigations. For that reason, the existing research on ALGS alone is not helpful.

All indications indicate AGLS, when part of a coordinated deployment of mutually supportive and dependent technology systems, can be a promising part of a broader approach. Principles of evidence-based policing support a focus on areas where crime is concentrated. Recent trends in SPD's shots fired data suggest a nexus to violent networks and repeat offenders suggesting the value of a more focused, coordinated criminal investigation to interrupt and interdict the pattern of offending.

Some jurisdictions, such as London (UK), have approached this effort through a massive public deployment and coordinated sharing of CCTV. While this approach has been effective at addressing non-gun violent offending (knife crime, armed/strong-arm robbery), AGLS offers the unique opportunity to link video surveillance to a specific event in question (i.e., discharge of a firearm). This supports not only the efficiency of investigation work through identification and/or exoneration of potential suspects, but also the promised opportunity to save lives. SPD will evaluate the efficacy of the AGLS/ALPR/CCTV implementation through performance metrics native to the platforms (true positive indications of the discharge of a firearm as verified by objective evidence), as well as standard performance measures already in use: violent crime rate, priority one response time, patrol coverage when not responding to calls (over/under policing), equity, perceptions of trust, perceptions of safety. Successful implementation of this suite of technologies will be indicated by a decrease in violent crime, priority one response time, no increase or a decline in measures of police over-presence, measure of disparate impact, and an increase in perceptions of trust and safety.

This pilot will be data-informed and guided. It will terminate if data suggests the technology is ineffective. Utilizing the abilities of the Performance Analytics and Research Unit, the Seattle Police Department has a plan to actively manage performance measures reflecting the "total cost of ownership of public safety," Equity, Accountability, and Quality ("EAQ"), which includes measures of disparate impact and over-policing. In addition to a robust Continuous Intervention Assessment designed to inform, in real-time, the active development of a safer, more effective, Evidence-Based Policing (EBP) competency, the EAQ program assures just right policing is achieved with undue collateral harm.

2.3 Describe the technology involved.

Technology involved in AGLS consists of:

- Gunshot detection with acoustic sensors that detect, locate and alert police to the incident.
- Sensors use cell connectivity to transmit data for notification and analysis.
- Applications with maps, visual tools, the ability to hear gunshot audio, and review and retrieve analytical information such as where the incident happened, time of the day, number of shots fired, and types of shots.

2.4 Describe how the project or use of technology relates to the department's mission.

The mission of the Seattle Police Department is to prevent crime, enforce the law, and support quality public safety by delivering respectful, equitable, professional, and dependable police services. SPD's department priorities include the use of best practices that include officer safety guidelines and performance-based accountability to provide progressive and responsive police services to crime victims, witnesses, and all members of the community, and to structure the organization to support the SPD mission and field a well-trained sworn and non-sworn workforce that uses technology, training, equipment, and research strategically and effectively.

An AGLS would provide precise location information, accelerating the Seattle Police Department's response time to locate and preserve evidence, render aid more quickly prior to the arrival of EMS, capture those responsible for gun violence and overall, better serve the community.

2.5 Who will be involved with the deployment and use of the project / technology?

With initial deployment, the vendor will most likely be involved. Use of AGLS equipment will be managed by Seattle IT and Seattle Police Department or via vendor support contracts.

3.0 Use Governance

Provide an outline of any rules that will govern the use of the project / technology. Please note: non-City entities contracting with the City are bound by restrictions specified in the surveillance ordinance and privacy principles and must provide written procedures for how the entity will comply with any restrictions identified.

3.1 Describe the processes that are required prior to each use, or access to/ of the project / technology, such as a notification, or check-in, check-out of equipment.

The system will have a set of access controls based on what is required for each user. Only authorized/trained SPD and OIG personnel will have direct access to the AGLS system. System information on suspected gunshots may only be accessed or extracted for legitimate law enforcement purposes, as governed by SPD Policy 12.050.

3.2 List the legal standards or conditions, if any, that must be met before the project / technology is used.

The gunshot detection sensors will be placed to capture audio above 120 decibels, considered beyond the range of normal human conversation (normal conversation is between 60-70 decibels).

While SPD policy does not currently have provisions directly related to AGLS and gunshot detection, gunshot audio captured from the AGLS sensors will only be preserved as evidence if there are suspected gunshots associated with a crime.

3.3 Describe the policies and training required of all personnel operating the project / technology, and who has access to ensure compliance with use and management policies.

Supervisors and commanding officers are responsible for ensuring compliance with policies.

AGLS systems will only be made accessible to authorized SPD, OPA and OIG personnel. Authorized personnel will receive training in the AGLS system prior to authorization.

All SPD employees must adhere to laws, City policy, and Department Policy (SPD Policy 5.001), and any employees suspected of being in violation of laws or policy or other misconduct are subject to discipline, as outlined in SPD Policy 5.002.

4.0 Data Collection and Use

4.1 Provide details about what information is being collected from sources other than an individual, including other IT systems, systems of record, commercial data aggregators, publicly available data and/or other City departments.

The information collected with the AGLS system are gunshot audio recordings with a short segment before and a short segment after a detected gunshot incident, as well as the estimated location of where the shot occurred. The audio recordings include only gunshots (no conversations), and only records if the technology detects a sound of 120 decibels or above (much louder than the normal range of human conversation which is typically 60 – 70 decibels). The recordings and associated locations are retained for as long as SPD needs based on investigative and operational requirements.

4.2 What measures are in place to minimize inadvertent or improper collection of data?

Most AGLS vendors use multiple acoustic sensors to locate a potential gunshot incident, which is then filtered using machine algorithms to identify and classify the event. Additionally, some AGLS vendors employ human acoustic analysts in a 24/7 review center as an additional accuracy check for each incident (for example, listening for common sounds that are mistaken for gunfire, like a vehicle “backfire”).

4.3 How and when will the project / technology be deployed or used? By whom? Who will determine when the project / technology is deployed and used?

The desired deployment date is mid-2024.

4.4 How often will the technology be in operation?

The AGLS sensors will be in operation 24/7 and be in operation for incident review. It will also be in continuous operation for the duration of the pilot program. The possible initial pilot areas under consideration are Aurora Avenue North, Belltown, Chinatown-International District, and the Downtown Commercial Core.

4.5 What is the permanence of the installation? Is it installed permanently, or temporarily?

At a minimum, the installation of the AGLS systems will last for the duration of the pilot program. It may extend beyond that period if effective.

4.6 Is a physical object collecting data or images visible to the public? What are the markings to indicate that it is in use? What signage is used to determine department ownership and contact information?

The sensors are approximately the size of a lunchbox and are generally placed on building rooftops or utility poles. There are typically no markings disclosed in efforts to mitigate vandalism or destruction. Some sensors have solar-powered capabilities; others need direct access to electricity.

4.7 How will data that is collected be accessed and by whom?

Only authorized SPD, OIG, and OPA users can access the AGLS data while it resides on the devices. Access to the systems/technology is limited to authorized personnel via password-protected login credentials or single sign-on.

Data extracted from the system/technology and entered into investigative files is securely inputted and used on SPD's password-protected network with access limited to authorized detectives and identified supervisory personnel.

Access is controlled by SPD Manual Title 12 provisions governing Department Information Systems including SPD Policy 12.040 - Department-Owned Computers, Devices & Software, SPD Policy 12.050 - Criminal Justice Information Systems, SPD Policy 12.080 – Department Records Access, Inspection & Dissemination, SPD Policy 12.110 – Use of Department E-mail & Internet Systems, and SPD Policy 12.111 – Use of Cloud Storage Services.

4.8 If operated or used by another entity on behalf of the City, provide details about access, and applicable protocols.

Vendors will have knowledge of the client and access to sound and location data only, no personal information.

4.9 What are acceptable reasons for access to the equipment and/or data collected?

Acoustic gunshot locator system data will be accessed and used to alert police and 9-1-1 of when and where a gunshot incident has taken place with the intention of accelerating the response capabilities of police and EMS personnel to aid victims, locate and preserve evidence and hold accountable those responsible for gun violence.

Data may only be viewed or extracted for legitimate law enforcement purposes, as governed by SPD Policy 12.050.

4.10 What safeguards are in place, for protecting data from unauthorized access (encryption, access control mechanisms, etc.) And to provide an audit trail (viewer logging, modification logging, etc.)?

Various measures will be in place to protect data from unauthorized access. This would vary from vendor to vendor, but SPD expects the following configuration:

- Data Encryption (in transit and at rest)
- Access control mechanisms (*meeting CJIS requirements)
- Strict user permission settings
- Industry-standard network security measures (meeting CJIS requirements)

The system will maintain audit logs of user and system actions. These logs will be maintained within the system and be accessible to those with permission to view. Logs will be accessible to the Office of Inspector General.

* Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS) Division of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) sets requirements for organizations that access or use criminal justice information. These requirements are referred to as "CJIS requirements" and are developed and audited for compliance by the FBI.

5.0 Data Storage, Retention and Deletion

5.1 How will data be securely stored?

AGLS data will be securely stored in a cloud-based environment. As an example, one major AGLS vendor stores data in Amazon Web Services (AWS), utilizing two-factor authentication and single sign-on (SSO) with Active Directory (AD) integration. The storage configuration will vary from vendor to vendor, but SPD expects similar industry standards when it comes to cloud storage and access controls.

5.2 How will the owner allow for departmental and other entities, to audit for compliance with legal deletion requirements?

The retention period for detected gunshot incidents will depend on whether the data gets used as evidence. Data that is not associated with a suspected gunfire incident will be overwritten every 30 days.

Audits from the Office of Inspector General or other official auditors, will be allowed as needed.

5.3 What measures will be used to destroy improperly collected data?

The risk of improperly collecting data is low given that audio recordings are only made if a sufficiently loud enough audio signal is detected (around 120 decibels), which is significantly higher than typical human conversation levels. In the event that human conversation is inadvertently collected (for example, screaming that rises above 120 dB), SPD will work with the AGLS vendor to have those audio files and associated locations deleted from the system. These deletions can be confirmed and verified by any appropriate auditor, such as the Office of Inspector General (OIG).

SPD Policy 7.010 governs the submission of evidence and requires that all collected evidence be documented in a General Offense (GO) Report. Evidence is submitted to the Evidence Unit and associated with a specific GO Number and investigation.

All information must be gathered and recorded in a manner that is consistent with SPD Policy 6.060, such that it does not reasonably infringe upon "individual rights, liberties, and freedoms secured by the Constitution of the United States and of the State of Washington, including, among others, the freedom of speech, press, association and assembly; liberty of conscience; the exercise of religion; and the right to petition government for redress of grievances; or violate an individual's right to privacy."

All SPD employees must adhere to laws, City policy, and Department Policy (SPD Policy 5.001), and any employees suspected of being in violation of laws or policy or other misconduct are subject to discipline, as outlined in SPD Policy 5.002.

5.4 which specific departmental unit or individual is responsible for ensuring compliance with data retention requirements?

Unit supervisors are responsible for ensuring compliance with data retention requirements within SPD.

Additionally, any appropriate auditor, including the Office of Inspector General can audit for compliance at any time.

6.0 Data Sharing and Accuracy

6.1 Which entity or entities inside and external to the City will be data sharing partners?

Data obtained from the technology may be shared outside SPD with the other agencies, entities, or individuals within legal guidelines or as required by law.

Data may be shared with outside entities in connection with criminal prosecutions:

- Seattle City Attorney's Office
- King County Prosecuting Attorney's Office
- King County Department of Public Defense

- Private Defense Attorneys
- Seattle Municipal Court
- King County Superior Court
- Similar entities where prosecution is in Federal or other State jurisdictions

Data may be made available to requesters pursuant to the Washington Public Records Act, Chapter 42.56 RCW ("PRA"). SPD will apply applicable exemptions to the data before disclosing to a requester. Individuals have the right to inspect criminal history record information maintained by the department (RCW 10.97.030, SPD Policy 12.050). Individuals can access their own information by submitting a public disclosure request.

Per SPD Policy 12.080, the Crime Records Unit is responsible for receiving, recording, and responding to requests "for General Offense Reports from other City departments and from other law enforcement agencies, as well as from insurance companies."

Discrete pieces of data collected by AGLS systems may be shared with other law enforcement agencies in wanted bulletins, in connection with law enforcement investigations jointly conducted with those agencies, or in response to requests from law enforcement agencies investigating criminal activity as governed by SPD Policy 12.050 and 12.110. All requests for data from Federal Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) authorities are referred to the Mayor's Office Legal Counsel in accordance with the Mayoral Directive, dated February 6, 2018.

SPD shares data with authorized researchers pursuant to properly execute research and confidentiality agreements as provided by SPD Policy 12.055. This sharing may include discrete pieces of data related to specific investigative files collected by the devices.

6.2 Why is data sharing necessary?

Data sharing is necessary for SPD to fulfill its mission of contributing to crime reduction by assisting in collecting evidence related to serious and/or violent criminal activity as part of investigation, and to comply with legal requirements.

6.3 Are there any restrictions on non-City data use?

Yes ☒ No ☐

6.3.1 If you answered yes, provide a copy of the department's procedures and policies for ensuring compliance with these restrictions.

Law enforcement agencies receiving criminal history information are subject to the requirements of CFR Title 28, Part 20, regulating criminal justice information systems. In addition, Washington State law enforcement agencies are subject to the provisions of WAC 446-20-260 (auditing and dissemination of criminal history record information systems), and RCW Chapter 10.97 (Washington State Criminal Records Privacy Act).

Once disclosed in response to PRA request, there are no restrictions on non-City data use; however, applicable exemptions will be applied prior to disclosure to any requestor who is not authorized to receive exempt content.

6.4 How does the project/technology review and approve information sharing agreements, memorandums of understanding, new uses of the information, new access to the system by organizations within City of Seattle and outside agencies?

Sharing agreements must meet the standards reflected in SPD Policy 12.055. Law enforcement agencies receiving criminal history information are subject to the requirements of CFR Title 28, Part 20. In addition, Washington State law enforcement agencies are subject to the provisions of WAC 446-20-260, and RCW Chapter 10.97.

Following Council approval of the SIR, SPD must seek Council approval for any material change to the purpose or manner in which the AGLS system may be used.

6.5 Explain how the project/technology checks the accuracy of the information collected. If accuracy is not checked, please explain why.

Most AGLS vendors use multiple acoustic sensors to locate a potential gunshot incident, which is then filtered using machine algorithms to identify and classify the event. Additionally, some AGLS vendors employ human acoustic analysts in a 24/7 review center as an additional accuracy check for each incident (for example, listening for common sounds that are mistaken for gunfire).

6.6 Describe any procedures that allow individuals to access their information and correct inaccurate or erroneous information.

Individuals may request records pursuant to the PRA, and individuals have the right to inspect criminal history record information maintained by the department (RCW 10.97.030, SPD Policy 12.050). Individuals can access their own information by submitting a public disclosure request.

7.0 Legal Obligations, Risks and Compliance

7.1 What specific legal authorities and/or agreements permit and define the collection of information by the project/technology?

There are no specific code provisions related to the collection of AGLS system data.

7.2 Describe what privacy training is provided to users either generally or specifically relevant to the project/technology.

SPD Policy 12.050 mandates that all SPD employees receive Security Awareness Training (Level 2), and all employees also receive City Privacy Training.

7.3 Given the specific data elements collected, describe the privacy risks identified and for each risk, explain how it was mitigated. Specific risks may be inherent in the sources or methods of collection, or the quality or quantity of information included.

SMC 14.12 and SPD Policy 6.060 direct all SPD personnel to "any documentation of information concerning a person's sexual preferences or practices, or their political or religious activities must be for a relevant reason and serve a legitimate law enforcement purpose."

Additionally, SPD Policy 5.140 forbids bias-based policing and outlines processes for reporting and documenting any suspected bias-based behavior, as well as accountability measures.

Finally, see 5.3 for a detailed discussion about procedures related to noncompliance.

7.4 Is there any aspect of the project/technology that might cause concern by giving the appearance to the public of privacy intrusion or misuse of personal information?

Inherent in audio obtained through AGLS sensors is the risk that private information may be obtained about members of the public without their knowledge. This risk and those privacy risks outlined in 7.3 above are mitigated by legal requirements and auditing processes that allow for any auditor, including the Office of Inspector General, to inspect use and deployment of AGLS systems. In addition, AGLS sensors typically only capture audio above 120 decibels, as noted in section 3.2. While very loud screams or shouts may be captured through the sensors, normal conversations should not be captured.

8.0 Monitoring and Enforcement

8.1 Describe how the project/technology maintains a record of any disclosures outside of the department.

Sharing of digital evidence outside the department is primarily done through SPD's digital evidence management system. Records of when data was shared and who it is shared with is noted in the system audit logs. Digital evidence shared outside of the digital evidence management system (e.g., using media such as DVDs, thumb drives, etc.) is done though SPD's Digital Forensic Unit, which logs requests.

Per SPD Policy 12.080, the Crime Records Unit is responsible to receive and record all requests "for General Offense Reports from other City departments and from other law enforcement agencies, as well as from insurance companies."

Any requests for public disclosure are logged by SPD's Public Disclosure Unit. Any action taken, and data released subsequently, is then tracked through the request log. Responses to Public Disclosure Requests, including responsive records provided to a requestor, are retained by SPD for two years after the request is completed.

8.2 What auditing measures are in place to safeguard the information, and policies that pertain to them, as well as who has access to the audit data? Explain whether the project/technology conducts self-audits, third party audits or reviews.

OIG conducts independent audits of SPD as instructed by the City Council and by City ordinance.

Financial Information

Purpose

This section provides a description of the fiscal impact of the surveillance technology, as required by the surveillance ordinance.

1.0 Fiscal Impact

Provide a description of the fiscal impact of the project/technology by answering the questions below.

1.1 Current or potential sources of funding: initial acquisition costs.

Current ☐ potential ☒

Date of initial acquisition	Date of go live	Direct initial acquisition cost	Professional services for acquisition	Other acquisition costs	Initial acquisition funding source
Q2 2024	Q3 2024	TBD	TBD	TBD	General Fund

Notes:

The 2024 budget contains a total of $1.5 million for use acquiring AGLS (gunshot detection) and CCTV technologies. At the time of writing, the procurement process has not yet been undertaken, so a breakdown of that funding has not yet happened.

1.2 Current or potential sources of funding: on-going operating costs, including maintenance, licensing, personnel, legal/compliance use auditing, data retention and security costs.

Current ☐ potential ☒

Annual maintenance and licensing	Legal/compliance, audit, data retention and other security costs	Department overhead	IT overhead	Annual funding source
TBD	TBD	TBD	TBD	General Fund

Notes:

At the time of writing, the planning process has not yet been completed.

1.3 Cost savings potential through use of the technology

The use of AGLS may help alleviate SPD's shortage of sworn staffing by reducing 911 calls, as well as reductions in gun and violent crime rates. While these objectives need to be evaluated, they do not necessarily correlate to direct cost savings but may result in mitigating staffing shortages.

1.4 Current or potential sources of funding including subsidies or free products offered by vendors or governmental entities

No funding beyond city General Fund dollars have been identified for this technology.

Expertise and References

Purpose

The following information is provided to ensure that Council has a group of experts to reference while reviewing the completed surveillance impact report ("SIR"). Any individuals or agencies referenced must be made aware ahead of publication that their information has been included. All materials must be available for Council to access or review, without requiring additional purchase or contract.

1.0 Other Government References

Please list any other government bodies that have implemented this technology and can speak to the implementation of this technology.

Agency, municipality, etc.	Primary contact	Description of current use

2.0 Academics, Consultants, and Other Experts

Please list any experts in the technology under consideration, or in the technical completion of the service or function the technology is responsible for.

Agency, municipality, etc.	Primary contact	Description of current use

3.0 White Papers or Other Documents

Please list any publication, report or guide that is relevant to the use of this technology or this type of technology.

Title	Publication	Link

Racial Equity Toolkit ("RET") and engagement for public comment worksheet

Purpose

Departments submitting a SIR are required to complete an adapted version of the Racial Equity Toolkit ("RET") in order to:

- Provide a framework for the mindful completion of the SIR in a way that is sensitive to the historic exclusion of vulnerable and historically underrepresented communities. Particularly, to inform the public engagement efforts departments will complete as part of the surveillance impact report.
- Highlight and mitigate any impacts on racial equity from the adoption and the use of the technology.
- Highlight and mitigate any disparate impacts on individuals or vulnerable communities.
- Fulfill the public engagement requirements of the surveillance impact report.

Adaptation of the RET for Surveillance Impact Reports

The RET was adapted for the specific use by the Seattle Information Technology Departments' ("Seattle IT") Privacy Team, the Office of Civil Rights ("OCR"), and Change Team members from Seattle IT, Seattle City Light, Seattle Fire Department, Seattle Police Department, and Seattle Department of Transportation.

Racial Equity Toolkit Overview

The vision of the Seattle Race and Social Justice Initiative ("RSJI") is to eliminate racial inequity in the community. To do this requires ending individual racism, institutional racism and structural racism. The RET lays out a process and a set of questions to guide the development, implementation and evaluation of policies, initiatives, programs, and budget issues to address the impacts on racial equity.

1.0 Set Outcomes

1.1. Seattle City Council has defined the following inclusion criteria in the surveillance ordinance, and they serve as important touchstones for the risks departments are being asked to resolve and/or mitigate. Which of the following inclusion criteria apply to this technology?

☐ The technology disparately impacts disadvantaged groups.
☐ There is a high likelihood that personally identifiable information will be shared with non-City entities that will use the data for a purpose other than providing the City with a contractually agreed-upon service.
☒ The technology collects data that is personally identifiable even if obscured, de-identified, or anonymized after collection.
☒ The technology raises reasonable concerns about impacts to civil liberty, freedom of speech or association, racial equity, or social justice.

1.2 What are the potential impacts on civil liberties through the implementation of this technology? How is the department mitigating these risks?

The technology will be used for the following purposes:

- Closed-Circuit (CCTV) camera systems will assist investigators in collecting evidence related to serious and violent crimes, including homicides, assaults, and other offenses. The CCTV system can aid investigators in identifying suspects, clearing the innocent, and removing deadly weapons from the street, thereby reducing the risk of harm to the public.
- The Acoustic Gunshot Location System (AGLS) will assist investigators in collecting evidence related to gunfire incidents and provide precise location information to responders. This information will direct officers and EMTs to a more precise location, enhance the collection of evidence that helps lead to justice for victims and remove illegal firearms from the community.
- Real-Time Crime Center (RTCC) software helps provide situational awareness to increase officers' and the public's safety and reactively investigate incidents. Having real-time, accurate information in one place helps increase the reliability of the location of victims and suspects, enabling quicker aid and safer apprehension. Having better visual and spatial suspect information will help reduce unnecessary stops by officers, focusing their efforts on verified locations and accurate descriptions.

Potential impacts on civil liberties include but are not limited to:

- Privacy concerns associated with surveillance of people, vehicles, and license plates in public places.
- Misuse of collected video and information/mission creep.
- Lack of transparency with the public on what is being done with recordings.
- Loss of personal autonomy with surveillance of an area.

To mitigate these potential community concerns, SPD will:

- Post signs indicating that police surveillance and video recordings are occurring.
- Ensure technology is being used for crimes related to gun violence, human trafficking, and other persistent crimes in the surveillance area.
- SPD will create a public-facing dashboard that will update frequently and report on the uses of the technologies, including areas where cameras are recording, mapping of where AGLS alerts are coming from, and the resulting number of police actions, such as arrests, court-authorized warrants, recovery of stolen vehicles, or other law enforcement actions.
- CCTV technology will only monitor public places, such as sidewalks, streets, and parks.
- Recorded material will only be kept for 30 days unless it is evidence of criminal behavior, in which case it will be transferred to SPD's secure digital evidence storage system.
- Provide access to CCTV, AGLS, ALPR, and SPD's Real Time Crime Center (RTCC) user and device logs to the Office of Inspector General (OIG) for compliance audits.
- The Office of the Inspector General will have full access to the RTCC operation.

Additionally, the technologies will only be implemented once the City's surveillance ordinance requirements are met and the City Council authorizes the use.

1.3 What are the risks for racial or ethnicity-based bias through each use or deployment of this technology? How is the department mitigating these risks?

Include a description of any issues that may arise such as algorithmic bias or the possibility for ethnic bias to emerge in people and/or system decision-making.

The mission of the Seattle Police Department is to prevent crime, enforce the law, and support quality public safety by delivering respectful, professional, and dependable police services. SPD Policy 5.140 forbids bias-based policing and outlines processes for reporting and documenting any suspected bias-based behavior and other accountability measures. This pilot will be data-informed and guided. It will terminate if data suggests the technology is ineffective. Utilizing the abilities of the Performance Analytics and Research Unit, the Seattle Police Department has a plan to actively manage performance measures reflecting the "total cost of ownership of public safety," Equity, Accountability, and Quality ("EAQ"), which includes measures of disparate impact and over policing. In addition to a robust *Continuous Intervention Assessment* designed to inform, in real-time, the active development of a safer and more effective, Evidence-Based Policing (EBP) competency, the EAQ program assures *just right* policing is achieved with undue collateral harm.

It's worth noting that many factors can contribute to disparate impacts in policing, most of which occur early in a person's life, long before there is engagement with the police. For example, systems and policies that perpetuate poverty, the failure to provide children with the strong and fair start they deserve in the crucial birth-to-five years, inadequate public education, and a lack of economic opportunity can all contribute to disparate outcomes. In addition, family dynamics and peer pressure can also create negative outcomes. We

recognize these factors and strive to do our part to mitigate them, but we can't expect our police officers by themselves to cure these contributory factors. However, we do expect our officers to do their jobs respectfully and fairly as they interact with community members.

These technologies are location-specific, with a place-based focus, meaning they will record people who choose to be in a public place where the technologies are being used. This mitigating factor reduces, to an extent, the possible disparate impact of potential police actions.

1.4 Where in the City is the technology used or deployed?

The following neighborhoods are being considered for deploying the CCTV and AGLS technologies. Specific areas will be selected based on the data analysis indicating where gun violence, human trafficking, and persistent felony crimes are concentrated.

☐ all Seattle neighborhoods

- ☒ **Aurora Ave N 85th to 145th**
- ☐ Ballard
- ☒ **Belltown**
- ☐ Beacon Hill
- ☐ Capitol Hill
- ☐ Central District
- ☒ **Chinatown/International District**
- ☐ Columbia City
- ☒ **Downtown Commercial Core**
- ☐ Delridge
- ☐ First Hill
- ☐ Georgetown
- ☐ Greenwood / Phinney
- ☐ International District
- ☐ Interbay
- ☐ North
- ☐ Northeast
- ☐ Northwest
- ☐ Madison Park / Madison Valley
- ☐ Magnolia
- ☐ Rainier Beach
- ☐ Ravenna / Laurelhurst
- ☐ South Lake Union / Eastlake
- ☐ Southeast
- ☐ Southwest
- ☐ South Park
- ☐ Wallingford / Fremont
- ☐ West Seattle
- ☐ King county (outside Seattle) (Mutual Aid)
- ☐ Outside King County (Mutual Aid)

If possible, please include any maps or visualizations of historical deployments / use.

Downtown & Belltown Area



Chinatown-International District Area



Aurora Avenue North Corridor



1.4.1 What are the racial demographics of those living in this area or impacted by these issues?

Race/Ethnicity	Aurora	Chinatown International District	Belltown	Downtown Commercial	Citywide
American Indian or Alaska Native	0.8%	0.7%	0.6%	1.1%	0.4%
Asian	14.0%	49.2%	30.4%	16.8%	16.9%
Black/African American	8.9%	8.6%	5.5%	11.1%	6.8%
Hispanic or Latino of Any Race	11.3%	7.6%	7.1%	8.3%	8.2%
Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander	0.3%	0.2%	0.2%	0.3%	0.3%
Other	0.7%	0.7%	0.6%	0.7%	0.6%
Multiple Races	7.9%	5.8%	4.9%	5.6%	7.3%
White	56.2%	27.2%	50.8%	56.1%	59.5%

Source: U.S. Census Bureau Decennial Census; OPCD

Note: Geographical areas provided are 2020 Census Block Assignments of Urban Villages within the Downtown Urban Center, with the exception of Aurora. Aurora's boundaries are based on ½ mile buffer from Aurora between Meridian and Greenwood, and from 85th to 145th.

1.4.2 How does the Department to ensure diverse neighborhoods, communities, or individuals are not specifically targeted through the use or deployment of this technology?

The use of CCTVs and AGLS will be deployed where crimes related to gun violence, human trafficking, and other persistent felony crimes are concentrated. SPD Policy 5.140 forbids bias-based policing and outlines processes for reporting and documenting any suspected bias-based behavior, as well as other accountability measures. This technology does not enhance the risks of racial or ethnicity-based bias.

These technologies are geographically focused on specific areas where gun violence, human trafficking, and other persistent felony crimes are concentrated. They are focused on individuals only if they are present in these areas.

1.5 How do decisions around data sharing have the potential for disparate impact on historically targeted communities? What is the department doing to mitigate those risks?

Data from the technology may be shared outside SPD with other agencies, entities, or individuals within legal guidelines or as required by law. Data may be shared with outside entities in connection with criminal prosecutions.

Data may be made available to requesters under the Washington Public Records Act, Chapter 42.56 RCW ("PRA").

Data sharing has the potential to be a contributing factor to disparate impact on historically marginalized communities. To mitigate this possibility, SPD has established policies regarding disseminating data related to criminal prosecutions, Washington Public Records Act (Chapter 42.56 RCW), and authorized researchers. Further, SPD Policy 5.140 forbids bias-based policing and outlines processes for reporting and documenting any suspected bias-based behavior.

1.6 How do decisions around data storage and retention have the potential for disparate impact on historically targeted communities? What is the department doing to mitigate those risks?

As with decisions around data sharing, data storage and data retention have similar potential for disparate impact on historically marginalized communities. The use of CCTVs and AGLS will be deployed where crimes related to gun violence, human trafficking, and other persistent felony crimes are concentrated. Video from CCTVs will be stored for 30 days unless imagery is needed for investigations or to comply with legal requirements. Further, SPD Policy 5.140 forbids bias-based policing and outlines processes for reporting and documenting any suspected bias-based behavior, and other accountability measures.

1.7 What are potential unintended consequences (both negative and positive potential impact)? What proactive steps can you can / have you taken to ensure these consequences do not occur.

The most important unintended possible negative consequence related to the implementation of CCTVs and AGLS is the possibility that the civil rights of individuals may be compromised by unreasonable surveillance. To mitigate this risk, SPD is enacting a specific policy codifying the allowable circumstances under which SPD may utilize CCTVs, AGLS, and Real-Time Crime Center software. Access to user and device logs will be given to the OIG so they can audit the use of these technologies.

To prevent unintended outcomes, the City will develop signage in areas that are covered by the cameras' view to alert the public to their presence and use. Additionally, the Office of the Inspector General will have access at any time to monitor and evaluate the use of these technologies. During the public outreach sessions described below, the City will listen to feedback from the public and provide responses during the technology review process.

The potential positive impact will be reduced serious crime concentrated in the locations where the technologies are deployed. If achieved, these reductions will create a safer environment for everyone who lives, works, plays, or visits these areas.

2.0 Public Outreach

2.1 Organizations who received a personal invitation to participate.

Please include a list of all organizations specifically invited to provide feedback on this technology.

The list of organizations will be listed in the final SIR.

2.1 Scheduled public meeting(s).

Meeting notes, sign-in sheets, all comments received, and questions from the public will be included in Appendix B, C, D, E, F, G, H and I. Comment analysis will be summarized in section 3.0 Public Comment Analysis.

Location	**Webex virtual meeting and in person option at the Bertha Knight Landes Room located on Floor 1 of City Hall (600 Fourth Avenue, Seattle, WA 98104)**
Time	February 12, 2024, 12:00 pm

Location	**Webex virtual meeting and in person option at a Community Center (details will be posted online shortly).**
Time	February 27, 2024, 6:00 pm

3.0 Public Comment Analysis

This section will be completed after the public comment period has been completed on [DATE] by Privacy Office staff.

3.1 Summary of Response Volume

Dashboard of respondent demographics.

3.2 Question One: What concerns, if any, do you have about the use of this technology?

Dashboard of respondent demographics.

3.3 Question Two: What value, if any, do you see in the use of this technology?

Dashboard of respondent demographics.

3.4 Question Three: What would you want City leadership to consider when making a decision about the use of this technology?

Dashboard of respondent demographics.

3.5 Question Four: General response to the technology.

Dashboard of respondent demographics.

3.5 General Surveillance Comments

These are comments received that are not particular to any technology currently under review.

Dashboard of respondent demographics.

4.0 Response to Public Comments

This section will be completed after the public comment period has been completed on [DATE].

4.1 How will you address the concerns that have been identified by the public?

What program, policy and partnership strategies will you implement? What strategies address immediate impacts? Long-term impacts? What strategies address root causes of inequity listed above? How will you partner with stakeholders for long-term positive change?

5.0 Equity Annual Reporting

5.1 What metrics for this technology be reported to the CTO for the annual equity assessments?

The goals of this project are:

1. Reduction in gun violence, human trafficking, and other persistent felony crimes in the pilot area.
2. Reduction in 911 calls in the pilot area.
3. To minimize crime displacement outside of the pilot area.
4. Improved police response times, crime clearance rates, and community satisfaction measures.

We will also report the rate of arrests and prosecutions that occur as a result of the pilot and any negative unintended consequences, such as over or under policing.

The Seattle Police Department, utilizing the Data Analytics Team and working with the Office of the City Auditor, will monitor these objectives and the outcomes closely to watch for disparate impacts. If data analysis shows any disparate impacts, SPD will work with the Auditor and the Office of the Inspector General to make the needed changes to address these impacts.

Privacy and Civil Liberties Assessment

Purpose

This section shall be completed after public engagement has concluded and the department has completed the racial equity toolkit section above. The privacy and civil liberties assessment is completed by the community surveillance working group ("working group"), per the surveillance ordinance which states that the working group shall:

"Provide to the executive and the City Council a privacy and civil liberties impact assessment for each SIR that must be included with any departmental request for surveillance technology acquisition or in-use approval. The impact assessment shall include a description of the potential impact of the surveillance technology on civil rights and liberties and potential disparate impacts on communities of color and other marginalized communities. The CTO shall share with the working group a copy of the SIR that shall also be posted during the period of public engagement. At the conclusion of the public engagement period, the CTO shall share the final proposed SIR with the working group at least six weeks prior to submittal of the SIR to Council for approval. The working group shall provide its impact assessment in writing to the executive and the City Council for inclusion in the SIR within six weeks of receiving the final proposed SIR. If the working group does not provide the impact assessment before such time, the working group must ask for a two-week extension of time to City Council in writing. If the working group fails to submit an impact statement within eight weeks of receiving the SIR, the department and City Council may proceed with ordinance approval without the impact statement."

Working Group Privacy and Civil Liberties Assessment

Respond here.

Submitting Department Response

Description

Provide the high-level description of the technology, including whether software or hardware, who uses it and where/when.

Purpose

State the reasons for the use cases for this technology; how it helps meet the departmental mission; benefits to personnel and the public; under what ordinance or law it is used/mandated or required; risks to mission or public if this technology were not available.

Benefits to the Public

Provide technological benefit information, including those that affect departmental personnel, members of the public and the City in general.

Privacy and Civil Liberties Considerations

Provide an overview of the privacy and civil liberties concerns that have been raised over the use or potential misuse of the technology; include real and perceived concerns.

Summary

Provide summary of reasons for technology use; benefits; and privacy considerations and how we are incorporating those concerns into our operational plans.

Appendix A: Glossary

Accountable: (taken from the racial equity toolkit.) Responsive to the needs and concerns of those most impacted by the issues you are working on, particularly to communities of color and those historically underrepresented in the civic process.

Community outcomes: (taken from the racial equity toolkit.) The specific result you are seeking to achieve that advances racial equity.

Contracting equity: (taken from the racial equity toolkit.) Efforts to achieve equitable racial outcomes in the way the City spends resources, including goods and services, consultants and contracting.

DON: "department of neighborhoods."

Immigrant and refugee access to services: (taken from the racial equity toolkit.) Government services and resources are easily available and understandable to all Seattle residents, including non-native English speakers. Full and active participation of immigrant and refugee communities exists in Seattle's civic, economic and cultural life.

Inclusive outreach and public engagement: (taken from the racial equity toolkit.) Processes inclusive of people of diverse races, cultures, gender identities, sexual orientations and socio-economic status. Access to information, resources and civic processes so community members can effectively engage in the design and delivery of public services.

Individual racism: (taken from the racial equity toolkit.) Pre-judgment, bias, stereotypes about an individual or group based on race. The impacts of racism on individuals including white people internalizing privilege, and people of color internalizing oppression.

Institutional racism: (taken from the racial equity toolkit.) Organizational programs, policies or procedures that work to the benefit of white people and to the detriment of people of color, usually unintentionally or inadvertently.

OCR: "Office of Civil Rights."

Opportunity areas: (taken from the racial equity toolkit.) One of seven issue areas the City of Seattle is working on in partnership with the community to eliminate racial disparities and create racial equity. They include: education, health, community development, criminal justice, jobs, housing, and the environment.

Racial equity: (taken from the racial equity toolkit.) When social, economic and political opportunities are not predicted based upon a person's race.

Racial inequity: (taken from the racial equity toolkit.) When a person's race can predict their social, economic, and political opportunities and outcomes.

RET: "racial equity toolkit"

Seattle neighborhoods: (taken from the racial equity toolkit neighborhood.) Boundaries defined for the purpose of understanding geographic areas in Seattle.

Stakeholders: (taken from the racial equity toolkit.) Those impacted by proposed policy, program, or budget issue who have potential concerns or issue expertise. Examples might include: specific racial/ethnic groups, other institutions like Seattle housing authority, schools, community-based organizations, change teams, City employees, unions, etc.

Structural racism: (taken from the racial equity toolkit.) The interplay of policies, practices and programs of multiple institutions which leads to adverse outcomes and conditions for communities of color compared to white communities that occurs within the context of racialized historical and cultural conditions.

Surveillance ordinance: Seattle City Council passed ordinance 125376, also referred to as the "surveillance ordinance."



SIR: "surveillance impact report", a document which captures the fulfillment of the Council-defined surveillance technology review process, as required by ordinance 125376.

Workforce equity: (taken from the racial equity toolkit.) Ensure the City's workforce diversity reflects the diversity of Seattle.

Appendix B: Questions and Department Responses

Appendix C: Meeting Notice(s)

Appendix D: Additional Comments Received from Members of the Public *

Appendix E: Letters from Organizations or Commissions

Appendix F: Supporting Policy Documentation