

**AN INDEPENDENT REVIEW
OF THE
1999 WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
CONFERENCE
DISRUPTIONS IN SEATTLE, WASHINGTON**

**A Preliminary Report
for the
City of Seattle
Focusing on Planning and Preparation**

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April 2000**

AWe are going to punish Seattle . . . so that no city will want to host it again, or they will have to establish such a restrictive level of security that they will violate everyone=s rights.@

Quotation from a demonstration leader.

PREFACE

This preliminary report presents the initial observations resulting from the independent review of the World Trade Organization Conference disruptions in Seattle, Washington, from November 30 - December 3, 1999, conducted by R. M. McCarthy & Associates and Robert J. Loudon, John Jay College of Criminal Justice/CUNY.

The City of Seattle and the Police Department have been both praised and criticized for their efforts in restoring order following extensive disturbances and riotous conduct reportedly intended to shut down the World Trade Organization Conference. This issue was further complicated by the presence of large numbers of protesters who were legitimately exercising their Constitutional rights to peaceably assemble and speak out in opposition to the World Trade Organization and other causes. Unfortunately, those who genuinely intended to protest in a non-violent manner were caught between those who had no such intention. Many became willing or unwilling participants in the violence, and their mere presence often impeded or prevented the police from making arrests.

Among other entitlements, the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides the right to freedom of speech and peaceable assembly. These rights are recognized as fundamental to a democratic society. However, the manner in which they are exercised has been, and continues to be, one of the major problems confronting governmental entities. As the enforcement arm of government, police agencies are often caught in the middle of dissenting factions, thus creating a true dilemma. If they take too little or no action, they are criticized by one faction for failing to enforce the law. If they aggressively enforce the law, they are accused by the other of violating their Constitutional rights. The eruption of violence during the World Trade Organization Conference in Seattle, Washington, was reminiscent of the often riotous 1960s and a dramatic example of this continuing dilemma.

Site of the 1962 World=s Fair, Seattle has long been recognized as a friendly, accommodating city with a diverse and multi-cultural population. The right of the people to express their opinions is strongly supported by City government and its agencies. Certainly the City is no stranger to the demonstration process, and peaceful demonstrations within the City have, for the most part, become the rule rather than the exception. This is due in large part to the willingness of both City administrators and the Police Department to accommodate protesters whenever possible and to conduct advance meetings with group organizers so that rules of acceptable conduct can be established. As a result, in most cases, demonstrations within the City have been conducted peacefully without interfering with the rights of others who are not involved. However, at this point in our review, there appears to be little doubt that the past success of these practices created an atmosphere of overconfidence which in turn led to an early and continuing underestimation of potential problems.

This preliminary report is based upon fact-finding visits to Seattle, numerous interviews of Police Department, City and other officials, at least 100 information-gathering telephone calls, and reviews of literally thousands of documents, including correspondence, e-mail and reports, as well as numerous videotapes related to the World Trade Organization Conference. Notwithstanding this extensive undertaking, the report must of necessity be limited to the more significant aspects of planning and preparation for the World Trade Organization Conference. Specifically, it will address relevant actions which were taken, or not taken, from February 12, 1999, when the Public Safety Executive Committee was established, through November 29, 1999 (the day preceding the World Trade Organization Conference Opening Ceremonies). Included in this report will be a discussion of the controversial incidents at 914 Virginia Street, which in the opinion of the reviewers, was a late pre-incident indicator and a missed opportunity for the Police Department to pre-empt at least some of the difficulties which would plague them for the duration of the World Trade Organization Conference. All other aspects of the operation will be comprehensively explored within the final report, which will be delivered no later than July 1, 2000.

Because of the narrow focus of this preliminary report, only three members of the review team participated in its preparation: Ron McCarthy, retired sergeant, Los Angeles Police Department, Robert Loudon, Ph.D., retired lieutenant, New York City Police Department and Director of the Security Management Institute at John Jay College of Criminal Justice/CUNY, and John Kolman, retired captain, Los Angeles County Sheriff=s Department. In addition, Rebecca Aadland, Ph.D., psychologist, Pima County (AZ) Sheriff=s Department and Captain Michael Foreman, Orange County (FL) Sheriff=s Department, will participate in the preparation of the final report.

Lastly, the level of cooperation and support extended to members of the review team by Mayor Paul Schell and his staff, and members of the Seattle Police Department, from Chief Herb Johnson through the entire chain of command, has been exceptionally positive thus far. Their candor and willingness to accommodate the requirements of the review team continue to be greatly appreciated. We would also like to express our sincere gratitude to the many residents of Seattle who openly shared their thoughts and feelings regarding the unfortunate disruptions which surrounded the World Trade Organization Conference.

PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS

The observations which follow are discussed in detail within the preliminary report. It must be emphasized that this is not a stand-alone document. Rather, it is but one segment of a comprehensive independent review of the entire World Trade Organization Conference operation. Numbers in parentheses following each observation refer to the page numbers in the body of the preliminary report where the specific topic is addressed. Concluding comments begin on page 34.

1. The City of Seattle, the Police Department and assisting agencies working together exerted considerable effort in planning and preparing for the 1999 World Trade Organization Conference. (1)
2. Prior to making an official commitment to host the 1999 World Trade Organization Conference, a thorough assessment should have been conducted of all available intra- and inter-agency resources, as well as those which might be available from the State of Washington. (5)
3. State, local and area law enforcement agencies should have been given a larger role in both planning and operational activities. (6)
4. Given the limited time frame, planning for the 1999 World Trade Organization Conference operation should have begun in earnest on a full-time basis as soon as possible following establishment of the Public Safety Committee. (9)
5. Police Chief Norman Stamper provided little direction to Seattle Police Department planners. (10)

6. The City of Seattle ordinance related to the collection of information for law enforcement purposes (Chapter 14.12) seriously hampered the Police Department=s planning efforts for the 1999 World Trade Organization Conference. (11)
7. Notwithstanding the prohibitions imposed by the Seattle ordinance related to the collection of information for law enforcement purposes, there was abundant intelligence from open sources available to planners indicating that demonstrations were likely to turn violent. (14)
8. The City of Seattle and the Police Department took extraordinary steps to accommodate protesters and ensure their First Amendment rights. (17)
9. The City of Seattle and Police Department officials should have negotiated through the Governor=s Office and National Guard officials for the assignment of National Guard personnel to the Seattle area for training purposes just prior to and during the World Trade Organization Conference. (20)
10. The Operations Plan should have provided for a reasonable, restricted safety zone encompassing selected venues and transportation routes. (21)
11. The Operations Plan should have provided for the highly visible deployment of regionalized demonstration management personnel in a pre-emptive role no later than November 26, 1999. (25)

12. The Operations Plan should have addressed in detail mass arrest policy and procedure. (27)
13. The Operations Plan should have formalized mutual aid policy, procedure and response requirements. (30)
14. Trespassing protesters occupying the Kalberer Hotel Supply Building at 914 Virginia Street on November 29, 1999, should have been removed as soon as practical and arrested. (31)

PLANNING AND PREPARATION

Although the review team believes strongly in their observations to date, it is certainly possible that as additional information becomes available during the full course of the review, selected observations may require modification. For this reason, reviewers have chosen not to develop conclusions at this early stage, but instead report their findings as preliminary observations. The observations contained within this preliminary report, and conclusions and recommendations which will appear in the final report, are not intended to impugn the integrity or intentions of those who were charged with the enormous responsibility of preparing a functional security plan for the 1999 World Trade Organization Conference. It is important to emphasize that the purpose of this report is not necessarily to establish blame, but rather to objectively identify those areas of the operation from which lessons can be learned and future performance improved. Supporting comments related to the planning and preparation phase of the operation follow each observation.

Preliminary Observations

1. The City of Seattle, the Police Department and assisting agencies working together exerted considerable effort in planning and preparing for the 1999 World Trade Organization Conference.

Comments

Preparing and implementing a comprehensive plan is one of the most important factors in achieving operational success. In order to ensure that nothing is left to chance and all foreseeable problems are considered, it is imperative that a well-defined course of action be taken. Before this can be accomplished, planners must be given an achievable set of objectives so that duplication and wasted effort can be eliminated, or at least minimized. As approved by City and Police Department executives, the following objectives were provided to guide the efforts of planners:

- To provide for the safety of foreign dignitaries, assembly participants, and citizens of the City.
- To maintain the Constitutionally protected rights of freedom of assembly and speech.
- To preserve the peace and minimize the disruption to commerce and other activities within the City.
- To maintain the orderly and safe flow of both vehicular and pedestrian traffic.

In the final analysis, only the second objective was attained. However, this should not be taken as an indication that planners intentionally failed to direct their efforts toward attaining all objectives. The fact that reviewers might have taken a different approach or placed a higher priority on one objective over another does not mean that security planners were somehow ill-intentioned in the approach they took.

The planning model selected by Departmental executives is contemporary among law enforcement agencies of comparable or larger size than the Seattle Police Department and similar in structure to that used by Los Angeles-area agencies in successfully planning for the 1984 Summer Olympic Games. A similar approach was also taken by the Seattle Police Department in planning for the Goodwill Games in 1990 and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference in 1993. Briefly stated, it consists of an umbrella committee comprised of executive-level personnel from involved agencies, who are responsible for providing direction and oversight to a number of specialized subcommittees which develop requirements and provide input within their particular areas of expertise. Assistance, coordination and access to resources are provided by a planning unit, which consolidates subcommittee input into a final operations plan. In the case of planning for the 1999 World Trade Organization Conference, the umbrella committee consisted of the Public Safety Committee; subcommittees were designated inter-agency groups such as the Demonstration Management Subcommittee; and the unit responsible for coordinating efforts, the Seattle Police Department's full-time Planning Unit. Periodic status reports and meetings enabled the Public Safety Committee to maintain currency, not only with security planning efforts, but also those of non-security-related committees. According to planners, this structure worked well and facilitated the use of available time.

Planners were hampered by the limited availability of information regarding the number of World Trade Organization delegates, dignitaries and heads of state, and resource availability.

This is a frequent problem confronting law enforcement agencies when planning for major events, and it is common practice under these circumstances to plan for a worst-case scenario.≡ In fact, this is one of the principle tenets of major incident planning. Planners for the World Trade Organization Conference followed this tenet, at least in part, when they decided to presume maximum attendance by delegates, dignitaries and other officials for planning purposes. Deficiencies noted by the review team in portions of the plan will be addressed briefly elsewhere in this preliminary report, and in more detail in the final report. However, these deficiencies are believed to have been prompted by past over-accommodation of planned protests and reluctance to recognize the necessity to establish restricted safety zones.

Few law enforcement agencies in the United States have been called upon to plan for an event the size of the World Trade Organization Conference in Seattle. Notwithstanding the end results, when the complexity, magnitude and short time frame for planning are considered, Police Department and assisting agency planners are to be commended for their dedicated and professional efforts.

Planning for a major event of this scope requires the input and cooperation of many factions. Certainly, one of the most important

of these factions is the leadership of those jurisdictions involved. As mayor of the host city, Seattle Mayor Paul Schell and his staff played an important role in security planning. While not physically involved in developing the plan, they were certainly responsible for providing appropriate oversight and ensuring that relevant information was made available to security planners. Following interviews with a number of security planners at both the executive and operational levels, it became apparent that the cooperation and direction from Mayor Schell and his staff were more than sufficient. The Mayor placed his trust in the executives of the Police Department to do what was necessary to ensure that the World Trade Organization Conference was a success for all involved. According to planners, both the Mayor and his staff were responsive to their requests within the bounds of budgetary constraints and reasonableness. Additionally, they assisted the planning effort by keeping residents of Seattle and other communities apprised of preparations through press releases, media interviews and use of the Internet. A website was established specifically to address World Trade Organization-related issues, and Mayor Schell established his own web page to respond to questions from members of the community.

Like Chief Norman Stamper, Assistant Chief Ed Joiner and other high-ranking members of the Police Department, Mayor Schell admittedly underestimated the potential for violence occurring during the World Trade Organization Conference. As the head of Seattle city government, he must assume a share of the responsibility for

any legitimately identified shortcomings of the operation, just as he would share in any accolades received.

2. **Prior to making an official commitment to host the 1999 World Trade Organization Conference, a thorough assessment should have been conducted of all available intra- and inter-agency resources, as well as those which might be available from the State of Washington.**

Comments

In May 1998, the Washington Council on International Trade corresponded with the United States Trade Representative (USTR) expressing an interest in hosting the 1999 World Trade Organization Conference. This overture ultimately led to a meeting between City of Seattle and State officials and members of the USTR, United States Department of State and the World Trade Organization. In November 1998, final meetings were held between City of Seattle officials, Police Department representatives and a World Trade Organization Site Selection Team. The selection of Seattle as the host city for the 1999 World Trade Organization Conference was announced by the United States Trade Representative on January 25, 1999.

The belief of City and State officials that hosting the World Trade Organization Conference would be beneficial not only to the City and King County, but the entire state of Washington, is understandable. Washington State is known to be the most trade-

dependent region in the United States, with one of every three jobs related to the importation or exportation of goods. As a result, actions taken by the World Trade Organization could have a serious impact on the City of Seattle, as well as the State. Hosting the World Trade Organization Conference would not only provide an infusion of visitor dollars into the local economy, but also a rare political opportunity to perhaps influence future decisions affecting the region.

These beliefs, coupled with past major events successfully conducted in Seattle, i.e., the Goodwill Games in 1990 and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference in 1993, undoubtedly and understandably created confidence in the ability of public safety agencies to provide the necessary level of security should Seattle be selected as the host city. However, taking into account the controversy surrounding past conferences and activities of the World Trade Organization, and particularly the violence associated with the Geneva Conference, the reviewers believe more effort should have been made to assess the possibility of similar actions occurring during the proposed conference in Seattle and to negotiate more reasonable dates for the Conference (the Thanksgiving Day/pre-Christmas time period should have been seen as fraught with many potential problems). Sufficient time existed between the expression of interest in May 1998, and final site selection meetings in November 1998, to accomplish this assessment, as well as determine necessary and available resources. These assessments

could easily have been conducted by potentially affected City departments prior to the final selection of a host city. Because of the political efforts expended in obtaining support for the selection of Seattle, it is unlikely that the City would have chosen to withdraw from host city consideration, regardless of assessment findings. However, these results might well have altered the planning approach ultimately taken, especially in the area of security planning and demonstration management. Additionally, agencies which might be requested to provide personnel and other resources would have received greater advance notice of the necessity to prepare for this eventuality.

Note: In fairness to planners, it should be pointed out that an inter-agency personnel and resource assessment was conducted, but too late in the planning process. Because of the inability to reimburse these agencies, the response received was to be expected.

3. State, local and area law enforcement agencies should have been given a larger role in both planning and operational activities.

Comments

It should have been apparent from the beginning that the Seattle Police Department lacked the personnel and resources to implement the provisions of a plan as extensive as that required to provide adequate security for the World Trade Organization Conference. In addition to conducting a thorough assessment of resources available elsewhere, as recommended earlier in this

report, the Public Safety Committee should have given state, local and area law enforcement agencies greater responsibility for providing direct assistance.

The prevalent feeling among these agencies was that the Seattle Police Department was clearly in charge, and other agencies would be relegated to support roles. Seattle Police Department planners indicated to the review team that they did not believe they caused other agencies to feel their services were not needed. They emphasized that agencies such as the King County Sheriff=s Office and Tukwila Police Department, were given responsibility for providing security at venues within their jurisdictions, and to respond in the event mutual aid assistance was required.

Regardless of the planners=s intent, the perception of other agencies was that they would be called if their services were required. Reviewers can find no fault with the designation of other agencies to provide security at venue sites within their jurisdictions. This is considered common practice within the field of major incident planning. Assistant Chief Ed Joiner apparently believed the Department had sufficient resources as long as mutual aid was available. This belief was not shared by other law enforcement officials, who believed problems would certainly erupt on November 30. The occurrence of problems on November 29 further strengthened this belief. As a result, the King County Sheriff=s Office pre-staged two of their platoons; thus they were available on November 30 when they were desperately needed. Had it not been

for this foresight, the situation on November 30 could have been even more grave. If the Sheriff=s Office had this capability, why were they not planned for in advance? The same could be said for additional personnel from the Washington State Patrol, and to a lesser extent, other agencies. To say it was not anticipated that they would be needed is to completely discount the amount of intelligence information available, and provided, from both official and open sources. There is no doubt in the minds of reviewers that this oversight by planners had far-reaching effects on the ability of the Police Department to control disruptions during the critical period of November 29 and 30.

The review team is well aware that letters under Mayor Schell=s signature were sent to other law enforcement agencies requesting an inventory of personnel and resources which might be available to the City of Seattle to assist in providing security during the World Trade Organization Conference. With few exceptions, responses to these letters were negative. However, all of the agencies pledged their support to provide available assistance if mutual aid was requested. In retrospect, it could be surmised that if these agencies had been made a part of the operation from the very beginning, perhaps their respective governmental entities could have budgeted for the requested resources. The review team would also be remiss if it did not mention that the drafting of these letters in May, six months prior to the World Trade Organization Conference, revealed an air of concern over the possibility of problems occurring

during the Conference. Ideally, budgeting for World Trade Organization Conference security should have been handled as it was for the 1990 Goodwill Games, wherein the budget was established and controlled by the State of Washington. Why the Chief of Police and others did not insist upon such an arrangement, or at least obtaining an established budget for the event, is unknown.

4. Given the limited time frame, planning for the 1999 World Trade Organization Conference operation should have begun in earnest on a full-time basis as soon as possible following establishment of the Public Safety Committee.

Comments

The Public Safety Committee, chaired by Seattle Assistant Police Chief Ed Joiner, was established on March 11, 1999, almost two months after the official announcement that the City of Seattle had been selected to host the World Trade Organization Conference. Had been planning begun on a full-time basis on March 11, there would have been less than nine months to plan for what must have been seen as a massive operation requiring large numbers of personnel and resources. Unfortunately, planning began in March on an intermittent, part-time basis. Many subcommittees were not established until May, and one of the most important, the Demonstration Management Subcommittee, was not operational until mid-July. The Afull-time≡ Planning Unit was formed in March but wasn=t functioning on a full-time basis until mid-July. Numerous

interviews confirmed that security planning for the World Trade Organization Conference did not begin in earnest (with the exception of the Traffic & Escort and Accreditation subcommittees) until the middle of July.

As a practical matter, only four months remained to complete a complex plan of operation. Even then, the only full-time planning entity was the Seattle Police Department's Planning Unit. Subcommittees met on a once- or twice-a-week basis. The enormity of the task confronting the Planning Unit can be appreciated when it is considered that most of the planning they had to perform depended upon information and recommendations developed by the part-time subcommittees.

Members of the review team have had extensive experience in major incident planning and can appreciate fully the tremendous burden which was placed upon the Police Department when it was given the task of preparing the security plan for the World Trade Organization Conference. It is doubtful that the Police Department could have dedicated sufficient personnel to the planning effort on a full-time basis as early as March 1999. However, such action was necessary in order to ensure that a complete and comprehensive plan was developed. Records reflect that the final draft of the Operations Plan was submitted to the Public Safety Committee on September 28, 1999, two months prior to the opening ceremonies of the World Trade Organization Conference. To prepare a complex multi-agency plan in such a brief period of time would have been

extremely difficult. Some of the deficiencies noted by reviewers may well have been the result of obvious time constraints.

5. Police Chief Norman Stamper provided little direction to Seattle Police Department planners.

Comments

Chief Norman Stamper was virtually absent from any role of leadership or direction related to preparation and planning for the World Trade Organization Conference. Printed documents and numerous interviews have reflected that he was a non-factor throughout the planning of the event. It was reported to reviewers that this was his management style. If so, it was a mistake of large proportion.

Chief Stamper wisely delegated planning to Assistant Chief Ed Joiner, a tenured and experienced member of his command. However, delegation of this important role in no way reduced the Chief's responsibility to provide direction, control and oversight of the planning effort. Although Chief Stamper was a member of the umbrella Public Safety Executive Committee, even this responsibility was delegated to Assistant Chief Joiner. Information obtained from various sources has indicated that the Chief and other command-level officers were preoccupied with administrative and unrelated pending legal concerns throughout preparation and planning for the World Trade Organization Conference. This preoccupation on the part of the Chief placed unnecessary additional burdens on Assistant Chief Joiner, who undoubtedly required no added responsibilities.

Whether this had an adverse effect on him is difficult to determine. However, the importance of planning for a successful and safe World Trade Organization Conference certainly warranted significantly more oversight than was provided by the Chief during the planning and preparation phase of the operation. In addition, Chief Stamper should have attended precinct briefing sessions and training as often as possible, particularly as the date of the World Trade Organization Conference approached. This would have enabled him to answer questions and dispel rumors which might adversely affect morale. According to information obtained from many Seattle Police Department officers at all rank levels, the morale of the Department had been in decline for some time prior to the World Trade Organization Conference. Morale is a fragile segment of the fabric that holds any organization together. The degree to which the morale of the Department impacted preparation is not a measurable factor. However, reviewers believe that the lack of leadership on the part of Chief Stamper contributed to the problems which occurred prior to and during the World Trade Organization Conference.

6. The City of Seattle ordinance related to the collection of information for law enforcement purposes (Chapter 14.12) seriously hampered the Police Department's planning efforts for the 1999 World Trade Organization Conference.

Comments

One of the most important requirements when planning for a major event such as the 1999 World Trade Organization Conference, is the ability to access available intelligence sources. The Seattle Police Department was the lead agency in planning for the Conference, yet was restricted in developing information or accessing that of other law enforcement agencies. For example, when it was learned from open-source documents that training was being conducted by an activist organization which had vowed to shut down the World Trade Organization Conference, the Department believed it was prevented from infiltrating the group because of the restrictive provisions of the City of Seattle's Intelligence Ordinance. This ordinance hampered the Seattle Police Department's planning efforts from the outset, because it limited the Department's ability to predict the potential for violence. When organizations develop a reputation for predictable violence, it is the responsibility of the police to attempt to prevent that violence.

Briefly stated, the City's Intelligence Ordinance severely limits the police from gathering or sharing information with other agencies unless criminal violations have occurred, or are occurring, within the City of Seattle. Information of groups committing illegal acts outside the City of Seattle cannot be gathered. Prior to engaging in actual violence, the person or group's actions within the City are protected under a Apolitical activity provision of the ordinance.≡ Although authorization to gather information can be obtained on a showing of reasonable suspicion that a person has, is, or is about to engage in

unlawful activity within the City, these efforts are scrutinized by a civilian auditor, and penalties attached if the auditor believes the ordinance has been violated. If a violation is found, the information gathered is provided, on order of the auditor, to the subject of the investigation with a cover letter announcing the violation. On a prior occasion of public disorder, where illegal acts were being committed, the Police Department videotaped the conduct, which was occurring in a public place. Any citizen could have legally videotaped the event, but when the auditor was made aware that the police had videotaped the incident, it was ruled that the Department had violated the Intelligence Ordinance. A fine was subsequently imposed.

The review team fails to comprehend how a police department in its preventive role can function effectively under such unreasonable restrictions. It is not difficult to understand why other law enforcement agencies are reluctant, or refuse, to share intelligence information with the Seattle Police Department. Interestingly, two weeks prior to the World Trade Organization Conference, very sensitive information was obtained by the Intelligence Subcommittee. Because of the Intelligence Ordinance, members of the Seattle Police Department were excluded from the meeting until sitting members could determine if it was possible to share the information with them. If this ordinance had not been in place, contemporary intelligence and undercover operations would have provided information that planners would have found difficult to

ignore. Considering the obvious problems created by the Intelligence Ordinance, it is troubling that Police Department executives, particularly Chief Norman Stamper, did not attempt to have the ordinance repealed, or at least significantly modified, long before the World Trade Organization Conference. Information obtained by the review team indicated that the restrictions placed upon the Police Department were not brought to the attention of the Mayor because executive-level members of the Department believed there was little, if any, chance the ordinance would be changed. During interviews with Mayor Schell, Deputy Mayor Maud Daudon, and members of the Mayor=s staff, confirmation was received that no Police Department executive had suggested repealing or modifying the ordinance. This is but one example of Police Department executives exhibiting a reluctance to communicate critical concerns to the Mayor. The reason for this reluctance has not as yet been determined by the review team.

The City=s Intelligence Ordinance is of grave concern to the review team, and for this reason, it will be addressed in more detail (including suggested modifications) in the final report.

7. Notwithstanding the prohibitions imposed by the Seattle ordinance related to the collection of information for law enforcement purposes, there was abundant intelligence from open sources available to planners indicating that demonstrations were likely to turn violent.

Comments

It would be simple indeed to place responsibility for underestimating the capacity of protesting groups to disrupt the 1999 World Trade Organization Conference on the restrictive provisions of the City's Intelligence Ordinance. However, to do so is to completely disregard the abundance of information to the contrary (mostly from the groups themselves) available from open-source documents. Interviews with high-ranking members of the Police Department were conducted to determine, among other things, if they should have known there was a potential for violence at the World Trade Organization Conference. The answer to this question is a resounding, yes. The failure of planners to accurately assess the potential for what ultimately occurred prior to and during the World Trade Organization Conference is difficult to understand in light of the following indicators:

- Information available from the Internet indicated that a large number of demonstrators would descend upon downtown Seattle and the Convention Center area, possibly more than 50,000 demonstrators.
- Note: Generally, 2% to 5% of any group can be expected to act in an unlawful manner. This obviously would dictate a potential for thousands of arrestees.
- Groups avowed to shutting down the World Trade Organization Conference were openly and actively training in preparation for doing so.

- Certain groups professed that they were committed to violating the law. The Anarchists was chief among this group, but by no means alone in their commitment.
- The first of two FBI threat assessments, issued in July, indicated there was a strong indication that considerable protest activity would be directed at the World Trade Organization during the Seattle Conference. The second assessment concluded that the threat of violent protest activity directed at the World Trade Organization ministerial was low to medium.
- Criminal acts had occurred at previous World Trade Organization conferences and related events, notably Geneva, Switzerland, and London, England, where violence was committed and boasted about.
- A number of anti-World Trade Organization articles appeared in print, and leaflets were distributed in large quantities condemning the World Trade Organization and its practices.
- Some of the organizers involved in the Seattle World Trade Organization Conference were involved in previous World Trade Organization demonstrations where violence occurred.
- Criminal acts involving arson, burglary and vandalism were committed in Seattle weeks before the World Trade Organization Conference, apparently by the same organizations which promised to shut down Seattle.
- An intelligence briefing in early November confirmed the high probability of criminal acts directed at the World Trade Organization Conference.

- Seattle Police officers voiced their concerns to management that the Aword on the street[≡] was that violence of great proportions was going to take place.
- During a management-level training session conducted for the Seattle Police Department by a representative of the International Association of Chiefs of Police, the probability of major problems occurring during the Conference, including violence, was assessed at 8.5 on a scale of 1 to 10.

The Police Department leadership either did not believe these pre-incident indicators or chose to ignore them. As a result, planners continued to exert the bulk of their efforts toward managing large but peaceful demonstrations. Consequently, less effort was directed toward the real threat of massive disruptions.

The assessment by planners that no violence of significance would occur during the World Trade Organization Conference proved to be incorrect. The common objective of the majority of groups pledging to demonstrate against the World Trade Organization in Seattle was to shut the City and the Conference down. This could not be accomplished without massive unlawful conduct, and planners should have realized this as soon as the intent of these groups became known. Their concerns should have been communicated to the Mayor and the City Council with the admonition that additional personnel and resources, i.e., King County Sheriff,

State Police and the National Guard, would be required to adequately prepare for the potential impact major disruptions would have on the City and the World Trade Organization Conference.

The review team could find no factual basis for predicting a peaceful World Trade Organization Conference.

Therefore, planners should have modified their plan in preparation for the obvious civil disruption that ultimately occurred. The argument that the plan could not have been changed so close to the opening of the World Trade Organization Conference lacks merit. Available intelligence, as well as the many late pre-incident indicators, justified innovative and aggressive adjustments in requesting assistance from the County and State. The failure of planners to do so had an obviously adverse effect on law enforcement's ability to gain an acceptable level of control over changing circumstances.

8. The City of Seattle and the Police Department took extraordinary steps to accommodate protesters and ensure their First Amendment rights.

Comments

No city or police administrator can expect to survive to lengthy tenure without recognizing the First Amendment rights of local, as well as non-local citizens who may choose to exercise them. Negotiation, compromise and selective accommodation are wise

techniques to ensure a peaceful demonstration. However, when taken to extremes, these very techniques can work to the detriment of police planners, who must facilitate these accommodations within the parameters of their plan. It is doubtful that many police departments would have accommodated protesters to the degree that was evidenced by the Seattle Police Department prior to and during the World Trade Organization Conference.

As mentioned elsewhere in this report, the second of four main objectives provided to planners was: ATo maintain the Constitutionally protected rights of freedom of assembly and speech.≡ Admittedly, the same techniques utilized successfully during past demonstration planning were used in preparing for the World Trade Organization Conference. However, it appears to reviewers that the Seattle Police Department unwittingly made this objective the primary focus of their attention -- unfortunately to the neglect of other planning objectives. As the time for the World Trade Organization Conference approached, Police Department representatives met with union officials, organizers and leaders in an effort to create mutual respect and understanding. These representatives raised the issue of the possibility of unlawful conduct and violence. They were assured that peaceful demonstrations would occur. Both the City and the Police Department worked diligently with demonstration leadership, and promised to assist in facilitating the movement of demonstrators. The Department=s work with demonstration leaders was professional and well-intentioned.

On more than one occasion during numerous interviews with Department managers, it was reiterated that Seattle had never experienced a major violent riot so there was no reason to expect one during the World Trade Organization Conference. The review team learned that the comment, "Seattle isn't New York, Chicago or Los Angeles," was spoken often when the suggestion was made that violence could occur during these demonstrations.

During meetings with group organizers, Police Department representatives unwisely provided information regarding the Department's intentions and capabilities to deal with mass arrests. Whether this was the result of misguided trust or complacency borne of past successful negotiations is unknown. On one occasion, organizers expressed concern that their group might not be able to protest in view of World Trade Organization delegates or other dignitaries. The Police Department's response was to predesignate protest areas in close proximity to all venue sites in the City. According to planners, this had been done with success on prior occasions. Past success aside, given the openly avowed objective of many groups to prevent the World Trade Organization from meeting, this was an extremely unwise and risky concession. It is surprising that federal agency representatives, particularly the United States Secret Service representative, would have approved such a plan in light of their protective mission. This is yet another example of unnecessary accommodation and a breach of sound security practices. In addition, the predesignation of protest areas reflects

the planners= apparent assurance that protests would be non-violent, thus contradicting both official and open-source information.

The City Council, the Mayor and his staff never anticipated that anything like what actually happened at the World Trade Organization Conference was remotely possible. What was expressed by City leaders was their concern for freedom of expression, free speech and the right to demonstrate. They openly stated the City would welcome all who would choose to come and express their views. Prior to the scheduled demonstrations, the Mayor addressed one gathering and urged them, APlease be kind to our City.≡ In the final analysis, many ignored his request. Although obviously well-intentioned, the solicitation of those who wished to express their views by the Mayor and members of the City Council was ill-advised. Neither City government or the Police Department had an obligation to welcome protesters and ensure their comfort. The First Amendment requires only that prescribed entitlements not be infringed upon. No one can doubt that the City of Seattle and the Police Department provided every opportunity for individuals and groups to exercise their First Amendment rights.

In the preparation of this preliminary report, citizens of Seattle, including business people, were interviewed to garner their opinions regarding the protests which took place during the World Trade Organization Conference. As a result, there seems little doubt that the rights of protesters were exercised to the detriment of local citizens. For example, the parent of a young child was prevented

from reaching her daughter=s daycare location because demonstrators made the effort impossible. An employee of a downtown business could not drive to her home in Tacoma for two days because demonstrators prevented her from doing so. There is no question that restriction of free movement can occur when demonstrations, parades and marches take place. However, the denial of the freedom to move, walk or drive on the part of one citizen, because others believe their issues come first, should not be tolerated.

9. The City of Seattle and Police Department officials should have negotiated through the Governor=s Office and National Guard officials for the assignment of National Guard personnel to the Seattle area for training purposes just prior to and during the World Trade Organization Conference.

Comments

As it became increasingly more apparent that massive disruptions and violence were a distinct possibility, planners should have strongly advocated pursuing the assignment of Washington National Guard personnel to the Seattle area in a training/standby capacity just prior to and during the World Trade Organization Conference. This approach has been taken by many police departments within the United States in preparing for events such as the World Trade Organization Conference. A historical case in point is the 1968 Democratic National Convention in Chicago. Ironically, the same options which were available to the City of Chicago and

Police Department planners were available to the City of Seattle and its Police Department in planning for the 1999 World Trade Organization Conference. When asked by Chicago Mayor Richard Daley what security assistance the Illinois National Guard might be able to provide, Brigadier General Richard Dunn suggested three options:

1. Plan in advance to call a predetermined number of guardsmen to state active duty during the Convention.
2. Schedule the weekly training assemblies of the National Guard units in a staggered manner in such locations that one unit would be immediately available for call on any night during the Convention week.
3. Do nothing in advance and request assistance from the National Guard only if needed.

Seattle Police Department planners were forced to select option number three when a National Guard representative advised them that National Guard personnel could only train on weekends. Additionally, it was learned unofficially that Governor Locke would be reluctant to activate National Guard personnel because of a recent financially draining deployment in response to threats at an Indian reservation.

Planners are to be commended for their foresight in inquiring about National Guard assistance. However, had the activation of selected numbers of National Guard personnel been pursued at the highest levels, given the threat potential and anticipated number of

dignitaries (including the President of the United States), it would have been difficult for the Governor to refuse assistance. At a minimum, one week of National Guard annual training time might have been allotted for assignment of personnel to the Seattle area.

Admittedly, either of these options would require lead time. Hence the importance of pursuing the request as soon as supporting intelligence became available. The immediate availability of the National Guard on November 29 and 30, in conjunction with other preplanned resources, might have changed the course of events during this crucial time period. As General Dunn replied in a 1968 letter to the Chicago Police Superintendent regarding assistance for the Democratic National Convention, AAs far as I am concerned, I would rather have them (Guardsmen) readily available on duty than to encounter difficulties and wish that we had done so. A decision in this regard, however, rests with the Mayor and the Governor.≡

10. The Operations Plan should have provided for a reasonable, restricted safety zone encompassing selected venues and transportation routes.

Comments

During the early stages of planning, selected members of the Seattle Police Department traveled to Washington, D.C., as guests of the United States Secret Service to observe the 50th Anniversary celebration of the founding of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

One of the control measures utilized during this event was a large Aexclusion zone≡, which enabled law enforcement to effectively

secure both attendees and affected sites. Although Seattle Police Department observers recognized this as an extremely effective technique, they did not believe it would be practical in Seattle. The following justification for this belief was offered by planners:

- An exclusion zone would adversely impact business within the area.
- Establishment of such a zone would require a large number of personnel.
- Problems could still occur outside the exclusion zone.
- Establishment of such a zone might be perceived as repressive by the people of Seattle.

Planners who were interviewed believed it was highly unlikely that the Mayor would support such an approach. The review team believes strongly that establishment and maintenance of a restricted safety zone was the only approach which would have ensured with any degree of certainty the security of transportation routes, World Trade Organization delegates, other officials and selected venue sites. Accordingly, this issue was discussed with Mayor Schell during an interview conducted by members of the review team. Significantly, the Mayor indicated that had he been approached early on and advised that the establishment of a safety zone was essential to protecting the venue sites and visiting dignitaries, he would have given the suggestion serious consideration. Although this response provides no assurance that he would have ultimately approved such an approach, it certainly is an indication of the Mayor's willingness

to consider the recommendation. It is the review team's understanding that the decision to reject the concept of a restricted safety zone was made by Assistant Chief Ed Joiner in part because of the number of personnel it would require. In all probability, the remaining previously listed reasons for not adopting the concept were considered as well. This decision was undoubtedly also affected by the mistaken belief that demonstrations would be conducted peacefully, as well as the success of control measures utilized by the Police Department in the past.

There is truth in the belief that the number of personnel required to sustain a restricted safety zone throughout the World Trade Organization Conference would have surpassed the personnel resources of the Seattle Police Department. However, had a more regionalized planning approach been taken from the outset, perhaps additional personnel might have been made available to assist in this effort. Ideally, the World Trade Organization Conference would have been considered a State of Washington event, thus providing the state, county and city resources necessary to plan for and manage as many contingencies as possible. Lacking these resources, it would be extremely difficult to sustain an effective restricted safety zone. However, reviewers believe that a smaller-than-ideal safety zone could have been established through the more effective and expanded use of sturdy barricades and police line tape to define the perimeter of the restricted safety zone. The increased and strategic use of

barricades would have minimized to some extent the number of personnel required to maintain the perimeter. This zone could have selectively included venue sites and a transportation route to the Convention Center. The safety zone could have been modified and/or reduced/expanded according to scheduled activities, i.e., once Opening Ceremonies had concluded, security at the Paramount Theater could have been shifted elsewhere.

The restricted safety zone would have to have been established early, perhaps as early as November 26, in order to preclude arriving demonstrators from occupying the zone before it could be established. The safety zone could have been maintained through a combination of mobile vehicular patrols, squad-size foot patrols, motorcycle and equestrian patrols and fixed posts of varying size. In addition, two demonstration management platoons with prisoner transportation vans and booking capabilities would have needed to be staged within the safety zone at predetermined but flexible locations. The personnel and resources required to staff this effort would have been in addition to necessary venue security.

Well-defined zones of this nature, when visibly secured by the police, have a definite deterrent effect on a crowd. There can be no question in the minds of demonstrators that breaching or attempts to breach the perimeter of the zone would be seen as unlawful conduct.

Any permitted demonstrations prior to or during the World Trade Organization Conference would have had to be scheduled outside the restricted safety zone. By doing so, well-intentioned

demonstrators would have been less likely to be infiltrated by those with unlawful intent. Certainly, those who attempted to penetrate the safety zone would in all likelihood have been members of the latter group. As planners correctly recognized, establishment of a safety zone would not have precluded the possibility of disruptions outside of the perimeter. Fully equipped mobile personnel would have been required to deal with this eventuality, with the ability to call upon a reserve platoon for assistance should it become necessary. Prisoner transportation vans and booking teams would also have had to be an integral part of this control force, as would chemical agent response teams.

Admittedly, such a control measure could have been viewed by the public as extreme and repressive. However, if the primary security objective was to provide for the safety of foreign dignitaries, assembly participants and citizens of the City, establishment of a restricted safety zone should have been viewed as the most effective of available alternatives. Experience has shown that it is much easier to maintain already established control than to regain it once it has been lost.

- 11. The Operations Plan should have provided for the highly visible deployment of regionalized demonstration management personnel in a pre-emptive role no later than November 26, 1999.**

Comments

During the tumultuous decades of the 1960s and 1970s, there were two basic philosophies regarding law enforcement's response to large-scale demonstrations. The first doctrine held that law enforcement's response to the affected area should be limited to the normally assigned patrol force. A larger mobile force staged in preselected locations out of view would be deployed only if absolutely necessary. The rationale behind this approach was that law enforcement would not be accused of provocation if problems arose or violence erupted. Like any other method, if nothing of an untoward nature occurred, it was believed to be the result of the approach taken, thus reinforcing belief in its utilization -- at least, that is, until something untoward did occur. Unfortunately, when problems arose, the initially deployed patrol force had to bear the entire brunt of the problem. If the crowd was large enough or violent, it was entirely possible that the mobile field force might not arrive in time, or be able to maneuver through the crowd to rescue the patrol force.

During the late 1960s and early 1970s, this philosophy of deployment was strongly supported by the leadership of many law enforcement agencies -- as strongly as it was opposed by police officers who were unfortunate enough to be assigned as a part of the initial patrol force when trouble erupted. As a result of a number of major disruptions which occurred throughout the United States, wherein police officers literally had to fight for their lives while hoping the mobile field force would arrive in time, many law enforcement

administrators abandoned this approach in favor of one that had been used in the past with great success. The intent of this second doctrine was to pre-empt problems by deploying a sizeable, highly visible mobile field force in advance of scheduled demonstrations or unrest so that the agency=s response to trouble would be quickly recognized. Following this doctrine, arrests are made as soon as violations occur, whether they are the result of passive demonstrations or violent conduct. Not only does this remove many participants from the crowd, but also those who are most likely to foment violence and property damage. The importance of swiftly arresting as many violators as possible as soon as violations occur cannot be emphasized too strongly. Additional fully equipped mobile platoons are staged at preselected locations out of view and deployed as required. The renewed success of this approach to large-scale demonstrations and unrest was immediately recognized by those agencies which wisely chose to implement it.

Apparently based upon past experience and practice, Seattle Police Department planners selected the first of the two approaches just discussed. This selection proved to be a detriment to achieving their established objectives. On November 26, 1999, two platoons of Seattle police officers were deployed to control a number of planned protests in the downtown area. According to information received by reviewers, at one point an unpermitted group infiltrated the peaceful annual Holiday Parade (Bon Marche`) to protest against the World Trade Organization. The group was followed by the

police, but not arrested. Later, a large group with a sound van marched through the downtown area blocking vehicular and pedestrian traffic, as well as entry into a number of businesses. In lieu of making arrests, police provided an escort in an effort to maintain the peace. Not surprisingly, this group returned to demonstrate on November 29, only this time members of the group spray painted buildings and broke windows. Still no arrests were made. Over the next two days, numerous protests, permitted and unpermitted, were conducted, among them demonstrations at Nike Town and an anti-fur protest at Nordstrom's. No arrests were made.

The review team believes that as many arrests as possible should have been made at demonstrations preceding the opening of the World Trade Organization Conference on November 30. Not only would these early arrests have made it clear that lawlessness would not be tolerated, but at least some of the property damage that occurred on November 29 might have been prevented. It is probably true that nothing the Police Department could have done with the personnel and resources available during this time period could have prevented what ultimately occurred. However, had a restricted safety zone been established, protest areas designated outside of the zone, and additional personnel from other agencies been planned for and deployed in a pre-emptive manner on November 26, the results would likely have been different.

- 12. The Operations Plan should have addressed in detail mass arrest policy and procedure.**

Comments

Given the advance information relative to the number of protesters pledged to demonstrate in Seattle during the World Trade Organization Conference, as well as the open threats to shut down the Conference, the review team believes planners should have anticipated the great potential and necessity for mass arrests. Although consideration was given to this eventuality by planners, it was apparent to reviewers that not enough emphasis was placed upon this critical aspect of the operation. The mass arrest/booking plan, like other aspects of the overall plan, reflects a mistaken belief that demonstrations would be conducted peacefully and there would be no need for mass arrests. It also reflects a failure to adequately plan for contingencies.

The plan called for utilization of the abandoned Sand Point Naval Air Station Brig as a holding/booking area prior to transportation of arrestees to the King County Correctional Facility. However, staffing of this effort was woefully inadequate. As a matter of fact, when it was determined that there were insufficient personnel to implement the security plan, the mass arrest/booking effort was reduced considerably. This was undoubtedly frustrating for planners, but determining accurate staffing requirements should have been considered an extremely high priority. Certainly, at whatever stage of planning the shortage of personnel was recognized, strong measures should have been taken by the Chief of Police and the Mayor to remedy this shortcoming. Requests by

planners for them to do so should have been made in the strongest terms possible, emphasizing the consequences of failing to do so.

Ultimately, the shortage of personnel to adequately perform this function would be reflected in the field arrest process, as well as the operation at the Sand Point Brig.

- Reviewers question how formalized the mass arrest/booking process was, since no reference to the process could be found in the Operations Plan, Operation Guide or any other documents provided to the review team. Information obtained through interviews revealed that arrestees in the field were to be transferred to designated arrest/booking teams, which were to respond on request and transport arrestees to the Sand Point Brig, a distance of approximately six miles, for processing prior to transfer to the King County Correctional Facility. Reviewers do not question the intent of the planners in developing the mass arrest/booking plan, but do express concern over how such a process would be viewed as able to function effectively in light of the expected number of protesters and potential for large-scale arrests. Implementation of a mass arrest/booking plan requires the adherence to established (or modified) policy and procedure, along with positive leadership. Based upon the experience of reviewers, and knowledge of contemporary practice, the following requirements would have been necessary to increase the effectiveness of the mass arrest/booking process:

- Allocation of sufficient personnel to the various functional aspects of the plan.
- Establishment of protected satellite arrestee holding areas at predetermined locations accessible from the downtown area.
- Note: This is especially important because of the distance from the downtown area to the Sand Point Brig. Under this concept, arrestees would be taken to the satellite locations, where preliminary booking would take place and personal property removed.
- Assignment of prisoner transportation vans and arrest/booking teams as an integral part of each Demonstration Management Platoon to facilitate and expedite arrests.
- Provision of necessary supplies and equipment at the Sand Point Brig, as well as the satellite arrestee holding area(s).
- Assignment of a full-time command-level officer to provide positive direction and oversight.
- Assignment of a public information officer to coordinate the release of information and respond to media requests.

Implementation of these additional requirements would admittedly have necessitated an increase in the number of personnel. But, like other areas of the security effort which lacked sufficient personnel, their allocation was essential to attaining the plan's objectives. Lastly, it is important to recognize that each of the observations and suggestions made throughout this report by the

review team are interdependent -- each function relies upon the effective performance of the other to succeed.

13. The Operations Plan should have formalized mutual aid policy, procedure and response requirements.

Comments

Prior to the initiation of planning for the 1999 World Trade Organization Conference, mutual aid directives were undoubtedly in existence. However, the review team could find no definitive reference to them in either the Operations Plan or Operation Guide. According to information obtained, there was little direction provided to mutual aid agencies prior to or following their activation. The result was a delay in deploying these valuable resources at a time when they were sorely needed.

In order to enhance the ability of mutual aid personnel to provide necessary and timely assistance, planners should have ensured that the plan minimally included the following:

- Designated but flexible areas of responsibility for all mutual aid agencies.
- A preselected secure staging area to accommodate the maximum number of personnel likely to respond.
- Printed forms for each responding agency containing pertinent information regarding personnel, by squad, i.e., person in charge, full names, ranks and badge numbers, identification of vehicles and equipment, etc.

- Printed after-action report forms.
- Assignment of a designated person(s) to the staging area to gather required forms, conduct predeployment briefings and assign personnel by agency to areas of responsibility.
- Note: Staging areas are often located in proximity to field command posts, but not so close that they hamper their operation.
- Assignment of a public information officer to coordinate the release of information and respond to media requests.

With specific reference to command and control, experience gained during disruptions which have prompted the deployment of mutual aid resources reflects the importance of an agency=s personnel retaining its own command. The obvious rationale for doing so is that personnel from one agency have in all likelihood received the same training and are accustomed to working together under the same leadership. Agency integrity also enables them to perform their assigned responsibilities according to their agency=s policy and procedure. Any operationally required deviations would be communicated to that agency=s command element by the Incident Commander or their designate. Obviously, if an agency is able to provide only a few personnel, there may be no choice but to integrate them within another agency=s structure.

During the planning phase of the operation, crowd and riot control training should have been conducted for all mutual aid agencies. Additionally, a pre-World Trade Organization Conference

briefing should have been conducted for those agencies which chose to attend. Ideally, this briefing would have been conducted at least two weeks prior to the Opening Ceremonies.

14. Trespassing protesters occupying the Kalberer Hotel Supply Building at 914 Virginia Street on November 29, 1999, should have been removed as soon as practical and arrested.

Comments

Information that members of the Anarchists= organization had occupied the vacant upper two floors of the Kalberer Hotel Supply Building should have been taken very seriously, not only because of the group=s known propensity toward violence, but also because the building is located in close proximity to the West Precinct Station.

Earlier in the day, patrol officers had unilaterally removed the trespassers without incident, but were unable to secure the building.

Following their departure, the trespassers re-occupied the building and apparently began to fortify the location. According to intelligence and other sources, the Anarchists were using the building to construct barriers for use in blocking intersections, as a staging/coordination center and a high ground observation platform.

Early in November, the Gap retail store in downtown Seattle was firebombed and Anarchist symbols spray painted on the sidewalk and walls. This was only one of a number of pre-incident indicators foretelling potential violence perpetrated by the Anarchists.

Information provided the review team indicated that personnel were

available to remove and arrest all trespassers on November 29, but were told to abandon their efforts by superiors.

The tactical advantages of removing and arresting Anarchists and other trespassers inside 914 Virginia Street are obvious.

- Members of a known militant group would have been at least temporarily prevented from initiating or instigating violence.
- Leadership of the Anarchists may have been adversely affected.
- Anarchists and other trespassers would have been denied a secure staging, rest and coordination site.
- Further efforts of the Anarchists in Seattle would have been hampered.
- The potential threat to the West Precinct Station would have been reduced.
- A zero tolerance policy of criminal acts and the willingness to arrest violators would have been visibly established, and perhaps have pre-empted at least some unlawful activity.

Note: Opportunities to exercise this pre-emptive approach within the City of Seattle existed as early as November 26, but no arrests were made. This issue will be addressed at length in the final report.

Some may feel that arresting the occupants of 914 Virginia Street for trespassing, a misdemeanor, would have accomplished little, since they could have posted bail and returned to participate in other activities. This assumption presumes there were no other

charges available (warrants, etc.) or that federal charges were not appropriate. One thing can be said with certainty, whether arrestees were able to post bail or not, the message would have been delivered that violence and other unlawful conduct would not be tolerated by the Seattle Police Department.

Significantly, the downstairs level of the Kalberer Hotel Supply Building was an active business. In addition to the tactical advantages of removing and arresting trespassers from the building, tenants' and owner's property rights also supported their removal.

This issue alone is of concern to the review team because it presents an interesting dichotomy. The City of Seattle is well known for accommodating the Constitutional rights of protesters. Therefore, if it is unacceptable for the police to infringe on a person's right to freedom of speech and assembly, is it not also unacceptable that they fail to protect the rights of other persons and property owners?

The 914 Virginia Street location remained a hotbed of activity throughout the World Trade Organization Conference, and in spite of the repeated complaints of the building owner (and intelligence reports of Anarchists' activities), no aggressive police efforts were initiated to remove the trespassing occupants. It was not until December 4, 1999, that the building was cleared, and then only through the negotiations of a private organization (with the support of the Mayor's office), which offered alternate housing to the trespassers. Since the World Trade Organization Conference had already concluded, there was no reason for the Anarchists to remain,

and they departed by bus, presumably for Eugene, Oregon, undoubtedly content with having successfully accomplished their objectives.

Concluding Comments

Planning and preparation for the 1999 World Trade Organization Conference involved extensive efforts on the part of the Mayor=s Office, the Seattle Police Department and other City departments. Preliminary results of this independent review reflect that deficiencies in planning by the Police Department were at least partially caused by (1) overconfidence prompted by past successes and over-accommodation of protesters, (2) lack of a designated and adequate budget for planning and conducting the operation, (3) insufficient personnel and equipment to implement the plan, (4) failure to heed obvious advance warning signs from various sources, (5) underestimation of the potential for violent demonstrations, and (6) a lack of leadership and direction by Chief Norman Stamper.

All agencies and planners were well intentioned, and it is clear that none wanted the disruptions which arose to occur. However, there is no question that as the head of City government, Mayor Paul Schell must share responsibility with Chief of Police Norman Stamper and Assistant Chief Ed Joiner for the end result of planning deficiencies. This responsibility is not theirs alone. All state, local and federal agencies which were involved in planning for the 1999 World Trade Organization

Conference share this responsibility to some degree, since their command officers ultimately agreed to the plan.

The media, too, is accountable. While there were incidents of objective reporting, most coverage was inflammatory and at times irresponsible. The people of Seattle who legitimately exercised their First Amendment rights, but refused to disperse and leave the area when ordered, thus preventing the police from making arrests and restoring order, also share in the responsibility for what subsequently occurred. Reasonable law-abiding citizens do not remain to watch or participate in anarchy. Lastly, it should never be forgotten that ultimate responsibility for the chaos and property damage which occurred rests with those who came to Seattle to, by their own admission, Ashut down Seattle and the World Trade Organization by whatever means necessary.≡

What happened in Seattle during the 1999 World Trade Organization Conference may well portend the nature of future disruptions in the United States. To the reviewers= knowledge, the World Trade Organization Conference disruptions constituted the first concerted effort to organize, propagandize and direct mass protests via the Internet. The experience gained and lessons learned by Seattle-area law enforcement agencies in confronting the many problems caused by this new wave of organized protests can be of inestimable value to other agencies. The review team is hopeful their efforts in preparing this preliminary report and the final independent review of what occurred in Seattle will assist other agencies in preparing for this eventuality.